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For my part, when I enter most intimately into
what I call myself, I always tumble, on some par-
ticular perception or other, of heat or cold, light
or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can
never catch myself at any time without a percep-
tion, and never can observe anything but the
perception.
David Hume (1711–1776)
22.1. Doubles
Illusory reduplication of the patient’s own body refer
to complex manifestations during which human sub-
jects experience a second own body or self in their
environment. Here we refer to this illusory second
own body or self as a double. Doubles may be seen,
felt, or heard, may be multiple or even concern the
inner organs of the patient. Doubles have fascinated
mankind from time immemorial and – often under the
term autoscopic phenomena – several distinct forms
have been described that can be separated based on
phenomenological, functional, and anatomical criteria.
The main forms of doubles are the visual own-body
reduplications: autoscopic hallucination (AH), heauto-
scopy (HAS), and out-of-body experience (OBE) as
well as the rarer forms including polyopic heautoscopy
and inner heautoscopy. These are referred to here as
visual doubles. Other own body reduplications include
feeling of a presence (sensorimotor doubles), hearing
of a presence (auditory doubles), and negative heauto-
scopy (negative doubles).
Doubles are abundant in folklore, mythology,
and spiritual experiences (Rank, 1925; Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1946; Todd and Dewhurst, 1962; Sheils,
1978; Arzy et al., 2005; Metzinger, 2005). In more recent
times, doubles became a frequent and popular topic in the
romantic literary movement of the nineteenth century
(Rank, 1925; Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955; McCulloch,
1992). Reflecting these popular trends, detailed case
descriptions (Muldoon and Carrington, 1929; Yram,
1972; Alvarado, 1992) and medical reports (Du Prel,
1886; Fe´re´, 1891; Sollier, 1903a) began to appear. Since
then, doubles have been repeatedly described in patients
suffering from neurological or psychiatric disease
(Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946; Lhermitte, 1939;
He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Todd and Dewhurst,
1955; Lukianowicz, 1958; Leischner, 1961; Fredericks,
1969; Devinsky et al., 1989b; Gru¨sser and Landis,
1991; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al., 1997).
Doubles have been related to various neurological dis-
eases such as epilepsy, migraine, neoplasia, infarction,
and infection (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946;
Lippman, 1953; Devinsky et al., 1989a; Gru¨sser and
Landis, 1991; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al.,
1997; Podoll and Robinson, 1999) and psychiatric
diseases such as schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and
dissociative disorders (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935;
Lhermitte, 1939, Bychowski, 1943; He´caen and Ajuria-
guerra, 1952; Todd and Dewhurst, 1955; Lukianowicz,
1958; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Simeon, 2004; Bu¨nning
and Blanke, 2005; Mohr and Blanke, 2005).
Yet, despite this large number of observations of
doubles in neurological disease they occupy a neglected
position in neurobiology and behavioral neurology.
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In addition, given the rarity of these manifestations, the
widespread neurological literature, and the complex
phenomenology, doubles have only recently been inves-
tigated systematically. This is surprising when looking
at the large number of studies investigating visual and
nonvisual illusory reduplication of body parts such as
phantom limbs (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998;
Halligan, 2002), which has led to the neuroscientific
investigation and description of many of the underlying
neurocognitive mechanisms for body part reduplica-
tions. Importantly these latter findings have not only
enhanced our understanding of phantom limbs, but have
also improved our models of corporeal awareness and
bodily processing (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998;
Brugger et al., 2000; Halligan, 2002). The scientific
value of a thorough understanding of visual illusory
reduplication of the entire body can thus not be over-
stated given its potential importance in understanding
the central mechanisms of corporeal awareness, embodi-
ment, and self consciousness.
Here we will first review phenomenological, func-
tional, and anatomical similarities and differences of
the three main forms of visual reduplication: out-of-
body experience, autoscopic hallucination, and heauto-
scopy. The separation into three distinct autoscopic
phenomena was initially developed by Devinsky et al.
(1989a) and subsequently extended by Gru¨sser and
Landis (1991), Brugger and colleagues (Brugger et al.,
1997; Brugger, 2002), and Blanke et al. (2004). These
authors agreed that the combined classification of the
well-known phenomenon of out-of-body experience
with the less known phenomena of autoscopic halluci-
nation and heautoscopy is important since during all
three autoscopic phenomena the subject has the impres-
sion of seeing a second own body (or double) in extra-
personal space. It has been speculated that these
phenomenological characteristics point to similar as
well as distinct neurocognitive mechanisms in the dif-
ferent forms of autoscopic phenomena (Brugger et al.,
1997; Blanke et al., 2004). Second, we will review the
rarer forms of autoscopic phenomena includingmultiple
visual doubles (polyopic heautoscopy) and inner visual
doubles (inner heautoscopy). The description of these
visual doubles is followed by a discussion of sensorimo-
tor doubles (feeling of a presence), auditory doubles
(hearing of a presence), and negative doubles (negative
heautoscopy) due to neurological disease.
The feeling of a presence is defined as the convincing
feeling that there is another person close by without
actually seeing that person (Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke
et al., 2003) and has been called previously “leibhafte
Bewusstheit” (Jaspers, 1913), “hallucination du com-
pagnon” (Lhermitte, 1939) or “feeling of a presence”
(Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke et al., 2003). Although
several patients with the feeling of a presence due to
focal brain damage have been described (for review
see Brugger et al., 1996), we do not consider the feeling
of a presence as an autoscopic phenomenon because it is
characterized by a nonvisual body reduplification as
opposed to the three main forms of autoscopic phenom-
ena which are all characterized by a visual body redu-
plication (see below; for alternative classifications of
autoscopic phenomena see: Sollier, 1903a; Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1939; He´caen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991; Brugger
et al., 1997).
22.2. Visual doubles
22.2.1. Out-of-body experience
During an out-of-body experience people seem to be
awake and feel that their “self,” or center of awareness,
is located outside of the physical body and somewhat
elevated. It is from this elevated extrapersonal location
that the subjects experience seeing their body and the
world (Blackmore, 1982; Irwin, 1985; Devinsky
et al., 1989a; Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004). The
subjects’ reported perceptions are organized in such a
way as to be consistent with this elevated visuospatial
perspective. The following example from Lunn (1970,
case 1) illustrates what individuals commonly experi-
ence during an out-of-body experience: “Suddenly it
was as if he saw himself in the bed in front of him.
He felt as if he were at the other end of the room, as
if he were floating in space below the ceiling in the cor-
ner facing the bed from where he could observe his
own body in the bed. [. . .] he saw his own completely
immobile body in the bed; the eyes were closed.”
An out-of-body experience can thus be defined as
the presence of the following three phenomenological
elements: the feeling of being outside one’s physical
body (disembodiment); the presence of a distanced
and elevated visuospatial perspective; and the seeing
of one’s own body (autoscopy) from this elevated per-
spective. These three aspects are shown graphically in
Fig. 22.2.
22.2.2. Autoscopic hallucination
During an autoscopic hallucination people experience
seeing a double of themselves in extrapersonal space
without the experience of leaving their body (no disem-
bodiment). As compared to out-of-body experiences,
individuals with autoscopic hallucination see the world
from their habitual visuospatial perspective and experi-
ence their “self,” or center of awareness inside their
physical body (Fig. 22.2). The following example of
430 O. BLANKE ET AL.
Case Study 22.1
Out-of-body experience
Blanke et al. (2002)
The present description of a patient with an OBE is
interesting as it shows that OBEs can be induced by
focal electrical stimulation of the human brain at the
right temporoparietal junction (Fig. 22.1). In addition
it highlighted shared functional and anatomical
mechanisms between OBEs and other illusory own
body perceptions such as illusory limb shortening
and movement, as well as vestibular processing.
In this 43-year-old right-handed woman OBEs
were induced by focal electrical stimulation of the
junction of the right angular gyrus and the posterior
superior temporal gyrus (Fig. 22.1). The patient under-
went intracranial presurgical epilepsy evaluation for
intractable seizures. Focal electrical stimulation at
currents of 3.5 mA (for 2 seconds) induced OBEs that
lasted for 2 seconds. OBEs were characterized by dis-
embodiment, elevated visuospatial perspective, and
autoscopy. During these OBEs the patient experienced
that she was localized under the ceiling almost as if
touching the ceiling with “her” back and looking down
on her (autoscopic) body that was lying motionless on
the bed. All stimulations at this current intensity were
associated with an instantaneous feeling of “lightness”
and “floating” about two meters above the bed. The
elevated self was experienced as a complete body,
although the patient was only sure about the presence
of trunk, head, and shoulders. Repeated stimulations
induced identical OBEs in the intrigued and surprised
patient who had never experienced an OBE pre-
viously. With respect to the autoscopic body the
patient reported that “I see myself lying in bed, from
above, but I only see my legs and lower trunk” (i.e.
negative HAS). In addition to seeing her body and
the bed, the patient experienced seeing the present
physicians and the table next to the bed. The visual
experience was described as highly realistic and not
dreamlike. Initial stimulations at the same site, but
with smaller currents (2.0–3.0 mA), induced vestibu-
lar responses, in which the patient reported that she
was “sinking into the bed” or that she has the impres-
sion of “falling from a height.” Interestingly, if the
patient was asked to look at certain parts of her body
during focal electrical stimulation she experienced
other illusory own body perceptions:if looking at
her limbs that were stretched out during electrical
stimulation (4.0–4.5 mA), she had the impression that
the inspected body part was transformed, leading to
the illusory visual perception of limb shortening. If
the limbs were bent at the elbow or knee she reported
that her legs appeared to be moving quickly towards
her face, and took evasive action (4.0–5.0 mA). Finally,
with closed eyes, the patient had neither an OBE nor
visual body-part illusions but perceived her upper body
as moving toward her legs (4.0–5.0 mA).
The patient suffered from complex partial seizures
since the age of 32 years. Based on invasive presurgi-
cal epilepsy evaluation by subdural grid electrodes,
the epileptic focus was located in the anterior and
medial temporal lobe and thus 5 cm anterior to the
site that induced OBEs.
Fig. 22.1. Out-of-body experience induced by focal electri-
cal stimulation. The out-of-body experience in this patient
was induced by electrical stimulation of the right temporopar-
ietal junction. The image shows a three-dimensional surface
reconstruction of the right hemisphere of the brain from mag-
netic resonance imaging. Subdural electrodes (dots) were
implanted in the brain of an epileptic patient undergoing
presurgical evaluation (see Case Study 22.1). The locations
at which focal electrical stimulation evoked behavioral
responses are shown:magenta, motor responses; green, soma-
tosensory responses; turquoise, auditory responses; yellow,
site at which out-of body experiences, body part illusions
and vestibular responses were induced (arrow). Stars indicate
the location of the epileptic focus in the anterior and medial
temporal lobe. Reprinted from Blanke et al. (2002) with
permission by The Nature Publishing Group.
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an autoscopic hallucination is taken fromKo¨lmel (1985,
case 6). “. . . the patient suddenly noticed a seated figure
on the left. ‘It wasn’t hard to realize that it was I myself
who was sitting there. I looked younger and fresher than
I do now. My double smiled at me in a friendly way.’”
22.2.3. Heautoscopy
The third form of autoscopic phenomena is heauto-
scopy, which is an intermediate form between auto-
scopic hallucination and out-of-body experience.
Individuals experiencing a heautoscopy also have the
experience of seeing a double of themselves in extraper-
sonal space. However, it is difficult for the subject to
decide whether he/she is disembodied or not and
whether the self is localized within the physical body
or in the autoscopic body (Blanke et al., 2004). In addi-
tion, the subjects often report seeing, in an alternating or
simultaneous fashion, from different visuospatial per-
spectives (physical body, double’s body) as reported
by patient 2B in Blanke et al. (2004) (see Fig. 22.2).
“[The patient] has the immediate impression as if she
were seeing herself from behind herself. She felt as if
she were ‘standing at the foot of my bed and looking
down at myself.’ Yet, [. . .] the patient also has the
impression of “seeing” from her physical [or bodily]
visuospatial perspective, which looked at the wall
immediately in front of her. Asked at which of these
two positions she thinks herself to be, she answered that
‘I am at both positions at the same time.’”
To summarize, the three forms of autoscopic phenom-
ena differ with respect to the three phenomenological
characteristics of disembodiment, visuospatial perspec-
tive, and autoscopy. Whereas there is no disembodiment
in autoscopic hallucination and always disembodiment in
out-of-body experiences, subjects with heautoscopy gen-
erally do not report clear disembodiment, but are often
unable to localize their self. Thus, in some patients with
heautoscopy the self is localized either in the physical
body, or in the autoscopic body, and sometimes even at
multiple positions. Accordingly, the visuospatial per-
spective is body-centered in autoscopic hallucination,
extracorporeal in out-of-body experience, and at an extra-
corporeal and body-centered position in heautoscopy.
Case Study 22.2
Autoscopic hallucination
Zamboni et al. (2005)
The present case description of an autoscopic hallucina-
tion illustrates how much visual detail may be con-
tained in the illusory image (of the autoscopic body)
that patients experience to see. Somewhat atypically
the autoscopic hallucination in this case was not parox-
ysmal, but persisted for several months allowing for the
patient to describe the autoscopic body in great detail.
A 30-year-old, right-handed female reported see-
ing in a permanent fashion her own image as though
she was looking into a mirror. Wherever she looked,
this mirror image was always in front of her, at a dis-
tance of about one meter from her eyes. If a solid
object was placed between the autoscopic image and
the patient, she said that she can still see the image,
but nearer to her, on the surface of the object. She
described that the autoscopic image was transparent,
yet somewhat blurred, setting “on a sheet of glass”
resting against whatever object she was looking at.
The image was life-sized and usually included head
and shoulders, but could extend as far as the legs if
the patient explored it by moving the gaze downward
over the figure. It was always dressed exactly like
the patient. Like a real mirror image, the autoscopic
image or body replicated her bodily movements, in
particular her face and arm movements. Interestingly,
while one of the examiners put his hand on the
patient’s shoulder the patient reported that she could
perceive something on the image’s shoulder similar
to a hand. The image disappeared when she closed
her eyes. The autoscopic hallucination was not asso-
ciated with an emotional state and the patient appeared
somewhat indifferent to its presence and disappeared
progressively after 3 months.
The patient suffered from hemorraghic infarction
to the occipital poles extending to the right parieto-
occipital junction (as demonstrated by magnetic reso-
nance imaging) due to gestosis and eclampsia, three
month before the above described hallucination. The
neurological examination during the period of the
autoscopic hallucination showed right lower limb
weakness, left visuospatial hemineglect, optic ataxia,
ocular apraxia, impaired depth perception, severe
object agnosia, prosopagnosia, and alexia.
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Fig. 22.2. Phenomenology of autoscopic phenomena a. Autoscopic hallucination: experience of seeing one’s body in extracor-
poreal space (as a double) without disembodiment (experiencing the self as localized outside one’s physical body boundaries).
The double (right figure) is seen from the habitual egocentric visuospatial perspective (left figure). b. Heautoscopy: an inter-
mediate form between autoscopic hallucination and out-of-body experience; the subject experiences seeing their body and the
world in an alternating or simultaneous fashion both from an extracorporeal perspective and from their bodily visuospatial per-
spective; often it is difficult for the subject to decide whether the self is localized in the double or in their own body. c. Out-of-
body experience: during an out-of-body experience the subject appears to “see” themselves (bottom figure) and the world from a
location above their physical body (extracorporeal location and visuospatial perspective; top figure). The self is localized outside
one’s physical body (disembodiment). The directions of the subject’s visuospatial perspective during the AP are indicated by the
arrows (modified from Blanke, 2004).
Case Study 22.3
Heautoscopy
Brugger et al. (1994)
The following HAS case underlines that HAS is not
only associated with a reduplication of the patients’
body, but also by a reduplication of the self as these
patients often cannot indicate in which of the two
experienced bodies their self is localized and often
claim to be localized at two positions simultaneously
or in rapid alternation. Reduplication of the self is not
present in AH and OBE.
A 21-year-old right-handedmanwoke up onemorn-
ing and described the following experience. When he
got up with a feeling of dizziness, he turned around
and saw himself still lying in bed. He was angry about
“this guy who I knew was myself and who would not
get up and thus risked being late at work.” He tried to
wake up the body in the bed first by shouting at it then
by trying to shake it and then by repeatedly jumping
on the autoscopic body in the bed. His double did not
show any reaction. Only then did the patient realized
that he should be puzzled about his double and became
more and more scared by the fact that he did not know
anymore who of the two bodies he really was (or where
his self was located). This was especially due to the fact
that he experienced his self-location to be alternating
between the two bodies. Thus, several times he experi-
enced being the one lying in bed and having the double
look down on him from above the bed and even beating
him. His only intention was described as trying to
become one person again: standing next to the window
(from where he could still see his other body lying in
bed) he decided to jump out the window “in order to
stop the intolerable feeling of being divided into two”
hoping that “this desperate action would frighten the
one in bed and thus urge him to merge with me again.”
The next thing he remembers is waking up in the
hospital.
This patient was known for complex partial seizures
since the age of 15 years due to a dysembryoblastic neu-
roepithelial tumor in themediobasal part of the left tem-
poral lobe. The neurological examination revealed
diminished right-sided hand agility, a severe deficit in
verbal memory, but not in visuospatial memory.
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The impression of seeing one’s own body is present in all
autoscopic phenomena (for further details see Brugger
et al., 1997; Blanke et al., 2004). Only during autoscopic
hallucination does the subject immediately realize the
hallucinatory nature of the experience, whereas heauto-
scopy and out-of-body experiences are generally
described as highly realistic experiences (Brugger et al.,
1994; Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004).
In a recent study Blanke and Mohr (2005) analyzed a
larger number of neurological cases with out-of-body
experiences, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucina-
tions related to confirmed brain damage. These authors
systematically analyzed 113 reported medical auto-
scopic phenomena cases from the English, German,
French, and Italian literature and finally considered 41
cases with autoscopic phenomena (20 cases with auto-
scopic hallucination, 10 with heautoscopy, 11 with
out-of-body experience) allowing amore detailed analy-
sis of phenomenology (especially of the autoscopic
body), associated neurological findings, etiology, and
lesion site for out-of-body experience, autoscopic hallu-
cination, and heautoscopy separately. With respect to
phenomenology, these authors observed that a partially
seen autoscopic body and its position in the visual field
differed between the different forms of autoscopic phe-
nomena. First, a partial autoscopic body was mostly
experienced by patients with autoscopic hallucinations
(63%) who always saw the upper part of the autoscopic
body including head, neck, and upper trunk (while arms,
legs, and lower trunk were missing). Second, in auto-
scopic hallucination the position of the autoscopic body
in the visual field was frequently lateralized to the side
of other visual hallucinations and hemianopia (Brugger
et al., 1996), whereas the autoscopic body in heauto-
scopy and out-of-body experience was generally in the
central visual field. Thus, these data do not agree with
Green (1968) and Brugger et al. (1996) who observed
a frequent lateralization of the autoscopic body also for
out-of-body experiences. This might be due to several
reasons. Green (1968) carried out her study in healthy
subjects and we only investigated neurological patients
with confirmed brain damage that wasmostly unilateral.
As Brugger et al. (1996) studied psychiatric and neuro-
logical patients, and also included neurological patients
with nonfocal brain damage as well as patients without
confirmed brain damage, differences in patient selection
might explain the phenomenological differences
between the different studies. Finally, the autoscopic
body is seen as standing or sitting in autoscopic halluci-
nation and heautoscopy, whereas it is in supine position
in out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004). These
positions were also found for the actual body position
of the patient prior to the autoscopic phenomena
suggesting that the position in which the patient experi-
ences seeing the autoscopic body directly reflects the
patient’s own body position prior to and during out-of-
body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic halluci-
nation. A supine body position was also found by Green
(1968) in 75% of her out-of-body experience subjects
and, interestingly, most techniques that are used to
voluntarily induce out-of-body experiences propose that
subjects use a supine and relaxed position (Blackmore,
1982; Irwin, 1985). On the contrary, the data of Blanke
and Mohr (2005) confirmed the mainly upright body
position in patients with autoscopic hallucinations and
heautoscopy as found by Dening and Berrios (1994).
Whereas the above described variables allow the dif-
ferentiation of autoscopic hallucination from heauto-
scopy and out-of-body experience, the following five
phenomenological characteristics of the autoscopic
body allow distinguishing out-of-body experience and
heautoscopy. First, whereas patients with out-of-body
experiences and autoscopic hallucinations experience
seeing the autoscopic body in front-view, patients with
heautoscopy often see the autoscopic body in side-
or back-views. Ionasescu’s (1960, case 7) patient, who
was a hairdresser experienced rotating around his custo-
mer (while cutting his hair) and then saw his autoscopic
body from the side. Blanke et al.’s patient (2004, case
2b) saw herself from behind as did Devinsky et al.’s
patient (1989a, case 9). Brugger et al. (1994) describe
a patient who saw the autoscopic body in many different
views. Second, this variability of views of the auto-
scopic body in heautoscopy is also reflected in the var-
ious motor actions that the latter is experienced
performing. Thus, patients with heautoscopy report that
the autoscopic body walks, runs, sits down, even shouts
at the patient, and beats him with his fists (for a very
vivid description of a patient’s experience see Brugger
et al., 1994). On the contrary, the autsocopic body dur-
ing out-of-body experience and autoscopic hallucina-
tion does not move or act. Third, heautoscopy is often
associated with the experience of sharing thoughts,
words, or actions, which are less frequent in out-of-body
experiences and autoscopic hallucinations. Indeed,
patients with heautoscopy experience hearing the auto-
scopic body talk to them (Brugger et al., 1994) or that
both bodies communicate by thought (Blanke et al.,
2004, case 5). Others patients stated that the autoscopic
body is performing the actions they were supposed to
do (Devinsky et al., 1989a, case 9) or fights with other
people that could be of potential danger to the patient
(Blanke et al., 2004, case 5). Fourth, whereas the visuos-
patial perspective was unambiguously localized and
experienced as unitary by all patients with autoscopic
hallucinations and out-of-body experiences (as was
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used to classify both phenomena), patients with heauto-
scopy frequently experience seeing from several differ-
ent visuospatial perspectives (Brugger, 2002; Blanke
et al., 2004). Indeed, patients 2b, 4, and 5 of Blanke
et al. (2004) experience seeing from two different physi-
cal positions as did Brugger et al.’s patient (1994).
Finally, patients with heautoscopy frequently report to
“be split into two parts or selves” or feel as if “I were
two persons” (Pearson and Dewhurst, 1954). Others
reported that theywere localized at two places at the same
time (bilocation; Blanke et al., 2004, cases 2b, 5). In
Brugger et al.’s patient (1994) bilocation occurred in
rapid succession between the autoscopic and physical
body and Lunn’s patient (1970) describes himself (during
heautoscopy) as a “split personality.” The latter five vari-
ables of the autoscopic double (different views; actions;
sharing of thoughts, words, or actions; multiple visuospa-
tial perspectives; bilocation or splitting of the self) were
all associated with heautoscopy. Thus, although out-of-
body experience and heautoscopy share many associated
hallucinations and some aspects of the autoscopic body,
they differ in these latter five, more complex, variables
suggesting that they are caused by different central
mechanisms. These phenomenological difference are
corroborated by functional and anatomical differences.
22.2.4. Clinical presentation
Although most of the aforementioned authors agree that
autoscopic phenomena relate to a pathology of own
body perception and/or corporeal awareness, it is not
known which of the many involved corporeal senses
are primarily involved in the generation of autoscopic
phenomena and whether there are differences between
the different forms of autoscopic phenomena. Whereas
many authors have argued that autoscopic phenomena
are due to a multisensory disturbance or disintegration,
most authors have argued that autoscopic phenomena
are caused by different sensory disturbances classifying
autoscopic phenomena as visual disorders, propriocep-
tive disorders, vestibular disorders, or body schema
disorders.
Some authors postulated a dysfunction of visual
processing (Fe´re´, 1891; Naudascher, 1910). Visual the-
ories considered autoscopic phenomena to be visual or
“specular” hallucinations based on the fact that they
were experienced and described by most patients
spontaneously as visual manifestations (Fe´re´, 1891;
Naudascher, 1910). In addition, especially autoscopic
hallucinations may sometimes be lateralized in the
visual field and are frequently experienced as visual
pseudohallucinations (Brugger et al., 1997; Brugger,
2002; Blanke et al., 2004). However, a number of
arguments show that a purely visual explanation cannot
account for autoscopic phenomena in general. First,
although all three forms of autoscopic phenomena are
described spontaneously as visual, they are frequently
experienced as veridical (especially heautoscopy and
out-of-body experience) and not as pseudohallucina-
tions (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946; He´caen
and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Brugger et al., 1997; Blanke
et al., 2004). Secondly, patients and healthy people re-
ported that the impression of reality and self-recognition
is preserved even if visual details of the autoscopic
body during the autoscopic phenomena differ from the
patient’s actual appearance (such as clothes, age, hair-
cut, size, coloring of the body (Sollier, 1903a; 1903b;
Lhermitte, 1939; Lukianowicz, 1958; Crookall, 1964;
Green, 1968; Irwin, 1985; Ko¨lmel, 1985; for discussion
see Blanke et al., 2004). In some patients, self-recogni-
tion may even be immediate if the patient only sees their
back during the autoscopic phenomena (Devinsky et al.,
1989a; Blanke et al., 2004). These data point to the
importance of nonvisual, body-related, mechanisms in
autoscopic phenomena, such as proprioceptive and/or
kinaesthetic processing as already argued by Sollier
(1903a; for later discussions see also Menninger-Lerch-
enthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1939; Brugger et al., 1997;
Blanke et al., 2004). In line with phenomenological dif-
ferences, these authors proposed that the involvement of
disturbed processing may differ between the different
forms of autoscopic phenomena. Paul Sollier (1903a)
for instance differentiated heautoscopy (or “autoscopie
dissemblable”) from autoscopic hallucination (or “auto-
scopie spe´culaire”) of previous authors such as Fe´re´
(1891) suggesting that both autoscopic phenomena
forms might relate to different cerebral mechanisms.
He postulated the latter to be amere visual hallucination,
whereas he assumed the former to be a proprioceptive–
kinaesthetic disturbance associated with a strong psy-
chological affinity between physical and autoscopic
body. For proprioceptive–kinaesthetic processing he
coined the term “ce´nesthesia” (as the body’s visceral
and deep sensations) stating that autoscopic hallucina-
tion and heautoscopy are due to different degrees of
the “projection of the body’s visceral and deep sensa-
tions in the space on the outside of the body” (Sollier,
1903a, pp. 34–44). Several authors have also high-
lighted the role of proprioception and kinesthesia in
autoscopic phenomena by noting that some patients
report shared movements between their physical and
autoscopic body (autoscopic echopraxia; Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1939; He´caen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Lukianowicz, 1958; Brugger et al.,
1997). Another sensory system, which has been linked
to autoscopic phenomena, is the vestibular system that
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conveys sensations of the body’s orientation in three-
dimensional space to the brain. Whereas Bonnier
(1904) and Skworzoff (1931) noted the frequent asso-
ciation of vestibular sensations of either peripheral or
central origin with autoscopic phenomena, others pro-
posed that a central vestibular dysfunction might be an
important mechanism for the actual generation of auto-
scopic phenomena (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935;
1946; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991; Brugger et al., 1997).
Menninger-Lerchenthal (1935) extended this view and
pointed to the importance of vestibular disorders in the
generation of visual illusions and visual dysfunctions,
as well as autoscopic phenomena. Blanke et al. (2004)
suggested, on clinical grounds, a differential implication
of vestibular processing in the different forms of auto-
scopic phenomena. These authors suggested systematic
differences in the strength of vestibular dysfunction in
autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, and out-of-body
experiences. The potential role of the vestibular system
for autoscopic phenomena is also supported by descrip-
tions of vestibular sensations during autoscopic phe-
nomena in healthy populations (i.e. Crookall, 1964;
Green, 1968; Yram, 1972; Blackmore, 1982; Irwin,
1985; Metzinger, 2003). Blanke et al. (2004) suggested
that out-of-body experiences were associated with a
gravitational (otholithic) vestibular disturbance,
whereas the vestibular dysfunction in patients with
heautoscopy was more variable and often characterized
by rotational components, and vestibular dysfunction
was absent in patients with AS. Finally, many patients
with autoscopic phenomena also experience paroxysmal
visual body-part illusions (Ehrenwald, 1931; Mennin-
ger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1939; He´caen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960; Lunn, 1970;
Dening and Berrios, 1994) and this has led several
authors to argue for a similar or closely related func-
tional and anatomical origin of visual body part illusions
and visual illusions of the entire body (Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946; Lhermitte, 1939; He´caen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960; Brugger et al.,
1997).
Recent findings from Blanke and Mohr (2005)
suggest that different patterns of hallucinations and
neurological deficits are associated with out-of-body
experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination
arguing for different functional mechanisms in each
form. Thus, vestibular hallucinations and body schema
disturbances, as well as the absence of hemianopia were
associated with out-of-body experiences and heauto-
scopy, whereas lateralized visual hallucinations and
hemianopia without vestibular hallucinations and no
body schema disturbances were associated with auto-
scopic hallucination. In addition, the visual hallucina-
tions of patients with autoscopic hallucinations were
lateralized to the side of hemianopia. Auditory halluci-
nations were mainly observed in patients with out-of-
body experiences. Other manifestations such as tactile
hallucinations, aphasia, and sensorimotor deficits were
infrequent in all autoscopic phenomena. Based on this
pattern of associated hallucinations and neurological
deficits, Blanke and Mohr (2005) argued that it is possi-
ble to differentiate the mainly visual autoscopic halluci-
nations from out-of-body experience and heautoscopy
confirming earlier case descriptions of autoscopic hallu-
cination as a visual or “specular” hallucination or pseu-
dohallucination by Fe´re´ (1891) and Paul Sollier (1903a).
Next to a confirmation of Fe´re´’s earlier theory of visual
mechanisms in autoscopic hallucination, Blanke and
Mohr’s (2005) analysis also provided evidence for a
vestibular and body schema pathology. However, this
was not found for all autoscopic phenomena, but speci-
fically for heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences
(Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946; Brugger et al.,
1997; Blanke et al., 2004).
22.2.5. Etiology
In comparison with the rich phenomenology of the
abovementioned studies, much less information is avail-
able about the etiology and especially anatomy of auto-
scopic phenomena, which is partly due to the fact that
many cases were reported in the first half of the twenti-
eth century. With respect to etiology, autoscopic phe-
nomena have been reported in various focal and
generalized diseases of the central nervous system.
Generalized neurological etiologies include cerebral
infections such as meningitis and encephalitis, intoxica-
tions, as well as generalized epilepsies (Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1939; Bychowski, 1943;
He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Lukianowicz, 1958;
Devinsky, 1989a; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger
et al., 1997; Blanke et al., 2004). Autoscopic phenom-
ena following focal brain damage also emerge from
a large variety of etiologies including focal epilepsy
(Devinsky, 1989a), traumatic brain damage (Todd
and Dewhurst, 1955), and migraine (Lippman, 1953),
vascular brain damage (Ko¨lmel, 1985), neoplasia
(Todd and Dewhurst, 1955), dysembryoblastic neuroe-
pithelial tumor (Blanke et al., 2004) and arteriovenous
malformation (Devinsky et al., 1989a).
22.2.6. Anatomy
Regarding their underlying anatomy, autoscopic phe-
nomena of focal origin primarily implicate posterior
brain regions and with respect to lobar anatomy most
studies found the temporal, parietal, or occipital lobe
to be involved (He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Todd
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and Dewhurst, 1955; Lunn, 1970; Devinsky et al.,
1989a; Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke and Arzy, 2005).
Some of these authors have either suggested a predomi-
nance of temporal lobe involvement (Devinsky et al.,
1989a; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991), a predominance of
parietal lobe involvement (Menninger-Lerchenthal,
1935; 1946; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952), or no
brain localization at all (Lhermitte, 1939). Menninger-
Lerchenthal (1935) even speculated on different anato-
mical substrates for the different autoscopic phenom-
ena, suggesting that autoscopic hallucination originates
at the junction of the parietal and occipital lobe (junction
of Brodmann’s areas 21 and 40), heautoscopy from the
angular and supramarginal gyrus (Brodmann’s areas
40 and 41), and out-of-body experiences from the super-
ior parietal lobule (Brodmann’s area 7). These anatomi-
cal dissociations have been partly confirmed by Blanke
et al. (2004) showing that autoscopic phenomena might
be related to damage to the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ; Fig. 22.3).
Unfortunately, the small number of analyzed patients
in this latter study did not allow lesion analysis for each
of the three forms of autoscopic phenomena. With
regard to predominant hemispheric involvement the
reported data are quite divergent. Some authors found
no hemispheric predominance for autoscopic phenom-
ena (He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Fredericks, 1969;
Devinsky et al., 1989a; Dening and Berrios, 1994),
while others have suggested a right hemispheric predo-
minance for autoscopic phenomena (Menninger-Lerch-
enthal, 1935; 1946; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991; Brugger
et al., 1997). For autoscopic phenomena in psychiatric
disease see Bu¨nning and Blanke (2005) and Mohr and
Blanke (2005).
An analysis of 41 cases with autoscopic phenomena
suggested that all three autoscopic phenomena may be
due to either right or left hemispheric brain lesions
(Blanke and Mohr, 2005) although there were differ-
ences with respect to primarily involved hemisphere
and brain region. Out-of-body experiences were mostly
due to right hemispheric brain damage (67%), whereas
more frequent left hemispheric brain damage was found
for patients with heautoscopy (67%). The fact that pre-
vious studies have analyzed the lesion location for all
autoscopic phenomena together, might thus explain
why some authors reported no hemispheric predomi-
nance (He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Fredericks,
1969; Devinsky et al., 1989a; Dening and Berrios,
1994). The data by Blanke andMohr (2005) would point
to a right hemispheric predominance for autoscopic hal-
lucination and out-of-body experience, something sug-
gested only for autoscopic hallucination by previous
authors (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; 1946; Gru¨sser
and Landis, 1991; Brugger et al., 1997). Regarding the
intrahemispheric lesion site of autoscopic phenomena
a high predominance of temporal lobe involvement in
all autoscopic phenomena (55–82%) was found by
Blanke and Mohr (2005) corroborating older literature
(Devinsky et al., 1989a; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991;
Dening and Berrios, 1994). The parietal lobe was also
found frequently and equally often involved in all forms
of autoscopic phenomena (45–55%; Blanke and Mohr,
2005). Only patients with autoscopic hallucinations
had significantly more involvement of the occipital lobe
concordant with the above described association with
visual hallucinations and hemianopia. Occipital lobe
involvement in autoscopic hallucinations was already
suggested based on the fact of frequent bright coloring
of the autoscopic body in autoscopic hallucinations
that contrasted with the colorless, pale, and misty
appearance of the autoscopic body in heautoscopy
Fig. 22.3. Lesion location in patients with autoscopic phe-
nomena. Autoscopic phenomena are linked to interference
with the temporoparietal junction. The figure shows the
results of lesion overlap analysis in the five patients with
autoscopic phenomena from Blanke et al. (2004). Each
patient is indicated in a separate color. The area of lesion
overlap (patient 1,5,6), of intracranial seizure onset (patient
2), or of the site of electrical cortical stimulation (patient 3)
of each patient is mapped onto the right hemisphere of Patient
6. Lesion overlap for all patients centred on the temporopar-
ietal junction (area indicated by dashed white line). Thick
black lines indicate the sylvian fissure and the central sulcus;
thin lines indicate superior temporal sulcus, postcentral sul-
cus and intraparietal sulcus. Modified with permission from
Blanke et al. (2004).
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(Brugger et al., 1997). Based on this it might be sug-
gested that patients with autoscopic hallucination might
have more posterior brain damage in occipitoparietal
and occipitotemporal cortex, whereas patients with
heautoscopy and out-of-body experience have rather
temporoparietal lesions including the TPJ.
22.2.7. Theoretical considerations
These data suggest that autoscopic phenomena may
result from a disintegration in personal space (due to
conflicting tactile, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, and
visual information) and a second disintegration between
personal and extrapersonal space (due to conflicting
visual and vestibular information) (Blanke et al., 2004;
Bu¨nning and Blanke, 2005; Mohr and Blanke, 2005).
These authors proposed that, while disintegration in per-
sonal space was present in all three forms of autoscopic
phenomena, differences between the different forms of
autoscopic phenomena were mainly due to differences
in strength and type of the vestibular dysfunction.
Indeed, Blanke et al. (2004) suggested that out-of-body
experiences were associated with a strong vestibular
disturbance, whereas heautoscopy were associated with
amoderate andmore variable vestibular disturbance and
autoscopic hallucination only with a mild or even absent
vestibular disturbance. The here reviewed phenomeno-
logical, neurological, and anatomical data suggest the
importance of a vestibular dysfunction and body schema
disturbance in heautoscopy and out-of-body experience
and suggests that a vestibular dysfunction is absent or
only weakly present in autoscopic hallucination. More-
over, the high frequency of visual hallucinations and
of hemianopia in autoscopic hallucination suggests that
deficient visual processing rather than vestibular pro-
cessing might be the main causative factor for disinte-
gration in personal space and/or extrapersonal space.
This is also in agreement with the anatomical findings
showing that autoscopic hallucination patients have sig-
nificantly more occipital lobe involvement as compared
to patients with heautoscopy or out-of-body experi-
ences. The phenomenological differences between
heautoscopy and out-of-body experience suggest that
each form of autoscopic phenomena relies on different
neurocognitive mechanisms. These more complex phe-
nomenological differences were found despite the
highly similar sensory hallucinations and neurological
deficits that were associated with heautoscopy and out-
of-body experience. Yet in contrast to out-of-body
experiences, heautoscopy was associated with the
presence of many different views of the autoscopic
body, many actions, the sharing of thoughts, words,
and agency, multiple visuospatial perspectives, and
bilocation of the self. We therefore suggest that the
association of greater phenomenological variability of
the autoscopic body (with respect to views and actions)
with the increased frequency of shared thoughts, voices,
and agency between autoscopic and (the patient’s) phy-
sical body (i.e. echopraxia) might be due to a greater (or
more variable) implication of abnormal kinesthetic/pro-
prioceptive information processing in heautoscopy.
This is contrasted in out-of-body experiences by the
silent and static autoscopic body, the disembodiment,
the 180 inversion and the elevated and distanced
visuospatial perspective of the self (with respect to the
extracorporeal environment) that are probably related
to vestibular disturbances (Blanke et al., 2004; Bu¨nning
and Blanke, 2005; Mohr and Blanke, 2005). Thus, it
seems to the subject with an out-of-body experience that
(1) their body position and visuospatial perspective is
distanced (about 2–3 meters) and rotated (by 180) with
respect to the actual physical position (Fig. 22.2). In
addition, during heautoscopy, the sharing of thoughts,
voices, and agencymight make it difficult for the patient
to decide where the physical agent (Gallagher, 2000;
Decety and Sommerville, 2003) is localized (i.e. in the
physical body or in the autoscopic body). This is
increased by two visuospatial perspectives that either
alternate or are simultaneously present between auto-
scopic and physical body in heautoscopy. This situation
makes it almost impossible for the heautoscopy patient
to decide where the observing self is localized andmight
lead to the experience of two “observing” selves
(Blanke et al., 2004, case 2b). It might thus be argued
that heautoscopy is not only an experience characterized
by the reduplication of one’s body, but also by a redupli-
cation of one’s self. As strikingly reported by Brugger
et al. (1994) the high risk of suicide during this ter-
rifying experience cannot be overstated as some of
these patients with heautoscopy try by all means to
re-establish their unitary self.
22.3. Multiple visual doubles
22.3.1. Polyopic autoscopic phenomena
Polyopic autoscopic hallucination or polyopic heauto-
scopy is present when patients report seeing more than
one autoscopic double in extracorporeal space, that is, a
multiple rather than a single reduplication of one’s own
body. Probably the first account of polyopic heautoscopy
is to be found in Mu¨ller’s (1826) seminal work on visual
hallucinations. Returning home late from work, this
exhausted university professor suddenly found himself
in front of 15 persons, all clearly recognized as doubles
of himself although being of different ages and wearing
different clothes he himself had used to wear in former
times. A case of an autoscopic hallucination with
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multiple optical images is reported by Roubinovitch
(1893;Au12 quoted by Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935). This
author’s patient saw three identicalmirror images of him-
self which he compared to the reflections he would have
seen standing in front of a mirror with three wings.
Other earlier autoscopic phenomena of polyopic nat-
ure can be found in Oesterreich (1910) and Leischner
(1961). As analyzed recently by Brugger et al. (2006)
polyopic autoscopic phenomena are characterized as
follows. In a third of the cases autoscopic phenomena
were characterized by either two or three doubles, but
most often by a large number of doubles that, in some
cases, filled up the entire room (Mayer-Gross, 1928) or
the interior of the patient’s body (Heintel, 1965). If
polyopic autoscopic phenomena are characterized by a
large number of doubles they are generally seen as quite
Case Study 22.4
Polyopic heautoscopy
Brugger et al. (2006)
This case highlights that HAS is not only associated
with a single reduplication of the patient’s body (as in
autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, or out-of-body
experience). Same patients may also experience seeing
multiple autoscopic bodies with varying degrees of
physical resemblance and psychological affinities.
A 41-year-old right-handed pottery maker woke
up one night and noticed that he had split into three
distinct parts: there was the left half of his body
which felt quite normal, a right half which, physically
and psychologically, felt detached from the left, and a
man adjacent to his right side, which he felt to be a
part of himself. It was as if he and the man were
“sharing the same soul.” This feeling was very con-
vincing despite the fact that there was no similarity
in physical appearance (for instance, the man was
blond while the patient’s hair is black). Puzzled by
this, the patient began to walk up and down in his
bedroom. As he did so, he at once discovered what
he later referred to as “the family.” He gives the fol-
lowing account: “When I walked around, I repeatedly
looked towards the gentleman on my side and won-
dered if I could recognize his face. This was impossi-
ble since on looking towards the right side he also
turned his head to the right. I could note however,
that the man was blond and about 50 years old. All
of a sudden, I noticed that, even more to the right,
there was a whole group of people. At a distance of
2 meters I saw an approximately 50-year-old lady
with blond braids. Still another 4 meters away, there
were two girls [both approximately age 20] and
some 20 meters from me, still in a straight line with
all the other persons, there was a boy [unspecified
age]. I knew right from the beginning that these per-
sons were intimately linked with one another, they
were father, mother, daughters and son.” [In reality, the
patient’s wife was younger and had dark short hair. His
only two children were two sons, aged 10 and 16]. The
patient reported that, with the appearance of the
“family,” the gap between left and right halves of his
body ceased to exist. He continued to feel a strong
sense of belonging towards the man at his right side,
which gradually expanded also to the woman and, to
a lesser extent, to the girls. The boy was only vaguely
seen and sometimes vanished in the darkness of the far
right end of the bedroom. Notably, all “family” mem-
bers imitated the patient’s movements, yet the “daugh-
ters” and the “son” were also able to move on their
own. The patient described: “When I walked, the
family walked with me; when I bent my knees, the
others bent theirs; when I looked to the right, so did
all the others. The girls were talking to one another,
and sometimes they would look towards me waving
their hands as if inviting me to join their world. . .
Naturally, I could not see the persons any longer on
closing my eyes, but the feeling remained that, pieces
of myself were located in those places I knew them
to stay. It was a feeling of being awfully frittered
away!” When his “real” wife was sitting at his right
side, the “family” would temporarily vanish and he
perceived himself to be one person in one place again.
However, he noted a clumsiness and weakness of the
entire right half of his body. As soon as his wife moved
from his side, the imaginary persons would immedi-
ately reappear in their respective places. According to
the patient’s wife account, the patient’s speech was
barely understandable throughout the experience and
contained many neologisms.
The patient suffered from partial seizures due to a
left insular astrocytoma that extended into the adjacent
frontotemporal cortex (as demonstrated by computed
tomography). Neurological examination revealed a
mild right-sided sensory hemisyndrome, logorrhea,
an elevated mood with fluctuating denial of illness,
and an isolated deficit in the recall of verbal material.
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small in size (Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955), whereas the
cases with a smaller number of doubles are mostly
experienced as having the same size as the patient.
Echopraxia (or sharing of action between the autoscopic
bodies and the patient’s body) was noted by two pre-
viously reported patients with autoscopic phenomena
(Staudenmaier, 1912/1968; Lance 1976). The doubles
are generally localized in the central visual field (latera-
lization in the visual field was only described by two
patients: Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955; Ley and Stauder,
1950). If mentioned, the perceived distance of the dou-
ble from the patient was generally very small and thus
in the peripersonal or personal space as is the case in
most patients with autoscopic phenomena. With respect
to etiology about two thirds of the cases were of neuro-
logical origin, a third due to psychiatric disease (one
case was reported during puerpurium). Of the neurologi-
cal cases, the large majority were of focal origin either
due to vascular infarction or focal epilepsy. In these
focal neurological cases the lesion was localized as
often in the right as in the left hemisphere.
The recent case reported by Brugger et al. (2006) cor-
roborated the importance of nonvisual, body-related,
mechanisms, also for polyopic heautoscopy (Sollier,
1903a; 1903b; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lher-
mitte, 1939; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Brugger
et al., 1997; Blanke et al. 2004) by showing an alteration
of own-body awareness (or depersonalization), detach-
ment of parts or of the entire left half of the patient’s
body (or dyssomatognosia), and vestibular illusions.
Interestingly, Brugger et al.’s patient report confirmed
that self-recognition and self-identification, as well as
psychological affinity between patient and double
occurs even if visual details of the body’s double differ
from the patient’s actual appearance. There were only
few physical similarities between this patient and the
closest double (Case Study 22.4). Yet, the patient felt a
strong psychological affinity towards him, as if the dou-
ble were a part of him, and as if they were to share
thoughts and feelings. Interestingly, self-recognition,
self-identification, and psychological affinity depended
on the distance between the patient and the experienced
location of the double. Thus, the doubles at greater dis-
tances (from the patients’s body) were perceived initi-
ally as different people and not as part of his own
body. Only later, once this patient experienced the dou-
bles as a group as well as closer with respect to his body
did he state that he experienced them as part of his self
(Brugger et al., 2006). It might thus be suggested that
the visuospatial characteristics of the experienced scene
such as the distance between patient and double relates
to such psychological processes as self-recognition,
self-identification, and psychological affinity with the
double. This relation might become especially evident
in polyopic heautoscopy where multiple doubles with
different characteristics are experienced simultaneously
at different locations and distances from the patient’s
body.
What are the functional mechanisms leading to the
perception of multiple visual doubles? Very little clin-
ical information is currently available on this rare auto-
scopic phenomenon as is also the case for other
multiple supernumerary body disturbances (Ehren-
wald, 1930). Interestingly, the patient described by
Brugger et al. (2006) initially observed only one single
right-sided double, but discovered the other more dis-
tant right-sided doubles upon moving his eyes onto
the closest double. This potential relationship between
eye movements and polyopic heautoscopy might be
important especially since eye movement related
mechanisms are considered one of the major pathome-
chanisms in classical polyopia (Bender, 1945; but see
Cornblath et al., 1998).
22.4. Inner visual doubles
22.4.1. Inner heautoscopy
A number of patients have been described that claim to
see the inner organs of their own body and this experi-
ence has been called inner heautoscopy. Schilder
(1935), He´caen and Ajuriaguerra (1952), and Dening
and Berrios (1994) only briefly mentioned inner heauto-
scopy, whereas Menninger-Lerchenthal (1935) and
Lhermitte (1951) and especially Sollier (1903b) dis-
cussed several cases of inner heautoscopy in greater
detail. There is a histrionic element to inner heautoscopy
andmost cases have been described about hundred years
ago (Comar, 1901; Bain, 1903; Sollier, 1903a; 1903b).
Patients with inner heautoscopy claim to see their
inner organs in extracorporeal space (Bain, 1903;
Sollier, 1903a; 1903b) or rarely within their own body
from an extracorporeal visuospatial perspective (Hein-
tel, 1965). Modern accounts of inner heautoscopy are
rare (Carlson, 1977, case #4; Magri and Mocchetti,
1967; Peto, 1969). Internal heautoscopy may also be
encountered during shamanic rituals (Eliade, 1951/
1964, p.62; cited in Brugger et al., 1997) and has been
reported in certain populations. (Irwin, 1985 reported
that Eskimos see their body as a skeleton under certain
conditions). With respect to medical reports, Comar
(1901; case #1) described a 18-year-old female patient
who reported seeing her heart, and another patient (case
#2) who claimed seeing her hip joint. Brugger et al.
(1997) described a patient who saw the interior of his
torso including blood circulating in vessels and another
patient who saw his skeleton. The case described by
Heintel (1965) is interesting as she did not describe
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seeing her inner organs in extracorporeal space, but
many different mirror images of her own body (of dif-
ferent sizes) inside her body. It thus seems as if this
patient experienced seeing doubles inside her body from
a disembodied visuospatial perspective that is generally
reported by subjects with an OBE.
Paul Sollier (1903b) described several patients who
experienced autoscopic hallucination or heautoscopy
in association with inner heautoscopy. He described
inner heautoscopy as “becoming conscious of one’s
inner organs, in their form, their placement, their struc-
ture, [and] their functioning (p.45)” and described a
patient claiming to see at different times her heart,
lungs, intestines, uterus, muscles, and even her brain
(Sollier, 1903Au11 , pp. 68–79). Sollier thought inner heau-
toscopy to be functionally related to other autoscopic
phenomena such as autoscopic hallucination and heau-
toscopy. Recently, Bradford (2005) suggested a rela-
tionship between inner heautoscopy and Cotard
syndrome. Critchley (1950, p. 338) characterized “hys-
terical inner heautoscopy” as “a pathological accentua-
tion of the body-image.” Bradford (2005) summarized
several patients with inner heautoscopy generally as a
“late middle-aged, usually female [patient], pacing
the wards of public psychiatric hospitals, describing
and bemoaning the extraction or diseased state of their
viscera, and, in keeping with their complaints of dam-
nation to Hell, occasionally complaining of excessive
bodily heat (‘I am burning. . . I am on fire’)” He adds
that “morbid transformations of the viscera are
reported more commonly than changes in the skeletal
structure.” Lhermitte (1939) mentions that inner heau-
toscopy might be related to sensations of referred pain
(Sinclair et al., 1948). In referred pain, pain of inner
organs is experienced at distinct spatial positions on
the patient’s body (Lhermitte, 1939, pp. 228–232).
Thus, cardiac pain is often experienced in the left hand
and arm, pain from the gall bladder in the right shoulder,
and kidney pain in the testes. Cardiac pain may even be
experienced in phantom limbs (Cohen and Jones, 1943;
cited in Lukianowicz, 1958). One could thus assume
that inner heautoscopy is related to pathological inter-
ference with shared representations of visceral and
somatosensory body parts in the brain. Clinical evi-
dence suggests that the insular cortex and the superior
temporal gyrus might harbour such shared representa-
tions. Thus, the conscious (nonvisual) experience of
one’s inner organs is frequently reported by patients
with temporal lobe epilepsy (Isnard et al., 2000). This
includes a variety of “visceral sensations” (Penfield
and Jaspers, 1954) such as epigastric sensations, abdom-
inal aura, palpitations, and more rarely nausea, vomit-
ing, suffocation, thirst, or constipation. Given that the
insula contains cortical representations of the inner
organs (Ostrowsky et al., 2000; Shelley and Trimble,
2004; Isnard and Maugie`re, 2005), that visceral sensa-
tions have been induced by electrical stimulation of
the insula and the superior temporal gyrus (Penfield
and Jaspers, 1954; Ostrowsky et al., 2000; Isnard and
Maugie`re, 2005), and the fact that the lesion site of auto-
scopic hallucination, heautoscopy, and out-of-body
experience most often affects the temporal lobe, one
might suggest that inner heautoscopy may be related
functionally and anatomically to a dysfunction of these
shared cortical representations of inner organs with cer-
tain parts of the body surface and the entire body. The
description of patient A.Ki. might be relevant in this
respect as electrical stimulation at various points of his
right insula induced sensations that included large parts
of the body surface as well as visceral (abdominal) sen-
sations (Penfield and Jaspers, 1954, pp. 426–431). Also,
as reviewed by Dorpat (1971), not only the amputation
of a limb, but also the resection of inner organs such as
uterus, stomach, and rectummay lead to phantom sensa-
tions for the removed inner organs. Inner heautoscopy
may thus be considered a visualized phantom sensation
for inner organs due to disturbed central mechanisms
with respect to visceral own body representations much
as autoscopic hallucinations and phantom limb sensa-
tions are due to disturbed central mechanisms of body
and limb representations. Finally, it might also be rele-
vant concerning the involved mechanisms in inner
heautoscopy to mention that the insula is a key region
of the vestibular cortex (Guldin and Gru¨sser, 1998;
Brandt and Dieterich, 1999) as it has been argued that
disturbed vestibular processing is a key mechanism in
autoscopic phenomena.
With respect to etiology, inner heautoscopy has most
often been described in patients suffering from hysteria
(Comar, 1901; Bain, 1903; Sollier, 1903a; 1903b).
Dening and Berrios (1994) mentioned that inner heauto-
scopy is often associated with agitated depression
(Dening and Berrios, 1994), but may also be observed
in patients with neurosyphilis and psychiatric disease
(Lhermitte, 1939; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952). To
our best knowledge, internal heautoscopy has not been
reported in neurological patients with circumscribed
brain damaged.
We conclude that (1) the histrionic element in inner
heautoscopy, (2) the rarity of cases and especially recent
descriptions, and (3) the absence of cases with confir-
med brain damage and detailed neuropsychological
examination does not justify classifying inner heau-
toscopy with the other autoscopic phenomena. These
observations also make clear that – at this point – any
functional theory is pure speculation, although many
associations–such as with other autoscopic phenomena,
referred pain, phantom sensations of inner organs, and
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Cotard syndrome, as well as visceral representations in
temporal and insular cortex – might be meaningful.
22.4.2. Negative heautoscopy and negative doubles
Negative heautoscopy is defined as the failure to see
one’s own bodywhen looked at either directly or in amir-
ror (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte, 1951;
He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Devinsky et al., 1989a;
Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al., 1997). As for
inner heautoscopy, case descriptions in neurological
patients are rare, although a few reports of negative heau-
toscopy due to focal brain damage exist. Negative
heautoscopy is discussed separately below (see negative
doubles).
22.5. Somatosensorimotor doubles
22.5.1. Feeling of a presence
The “feeling of a presence” refers to the illusion that
somebody is close by although nobody is around (Jaspers,
1913; Lhermitte, 1939; Critchley, 1950; 1955; Brugger
et al., 1996). It is defined as the convincing feeling that
there is another person close by without the patient actu-
ally being able to see that person (Brugger et al., 1996;
Blanke et al., 2003) and was initially described by Karl
Jaspers as “leibhafte Bewusstheit” (Jaspers, 1913). Later
authors have named this experience of a somatosensory
double “hallucination du compagnon” (Lhermitte,
1939), idea of a presence (Critchley, 1950), or more
recently “feeling of a presence” (Brugger et al., 1996;
Blanke et al., 2003). This experience of feeling another
human person close by is often described as highly realis-
tic and vivid, but may also be experienced as dreamlike
and ephemeral. It is mostly a transient experience, yet
might sustain for a longer time. It often disappears when
patients try to ascertain themselves that there is “nobody
there” by looking towards the felt location of the “pre-
sence.” Although the patients do not experience seeing
the “presence,” they are convinced of the presence of
the somatosensory double and can classically describe
its spatial localization very accurately (James, 1961;
Brugger et al., 1996).
Indeed, the “presence” is almost always experienced
on one side of the patient’s body (Fe´re´, 1891; Jaspers,
1913; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lippman, 1953;
Critchley, 1955; Williams, 1956; Lukianowicz, 1960;
Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke et al., 2003), in peripersonal
space, and most often less than 1 m from the patient’s
body (Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke et al., 2003). Impor-
tantly, some patients may also mention a psychological
affinity with the “presence” (Critchley, 1955; Brugger
et al., 1996), or a sharing of actions (or echopraxia) or that
the presence has the same body position as the patient
(Jaspers, 1913; Engerth and Hoff, 1929; Brugger et al.,
1996; Blanke et al., 2003). These latter points have led
most previous authors to consider the feeling of a pre-
sence as a disorder of own body perception and led to
its inclusion with other illusory own body reduplications
Case Study 22.5
Feeling of a presence
Brugger et al. (1996, case 2)
A 55-year-old right-handed woman reported several
times a day the brief sensation of having “a shadow”
in her right peripersonal space. She described that
“the shadow is always in front of me, about 50 cm
to the right. I feel that it is very familiar to me, and
I kind of know that it is a male shadow.” She did
not see the shadow yet she could “feel” it, although
she knew that there is nothing there. The shadow
was described as stable or stationary, was not experi-
enced as performing any action, did not talk to the
patient and never imitated the patient’s movements.
The experience was not occurring during or after
the patient’s epileptic seizures. Often the feeling of
a presence was associated by feelings of dizziness,
vertigo, and headache. Notably, while her husband
died some month afterwards, the patient began to
refer to the presence as her deceased husband.
Six months before admission the patient developed
headaches, rotational vertigo, and left-sided motor sei-
zures. The neurological examination revealed left-
sided hypoesthesia, a visuospatial memory deficit, mild
apraxia, perseveration, and visual agnosia. Computed
tomography demonstrated a space occupying lesion in
the right temporal lobe. Surgical treatment rendered
the patient seizure-free under anticonvulsant treatment.
She continued to daily experience the feeling of a pre-
sence at least for a period of 6 months.
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by most authors (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lher-
mitte, 1939; Lippman, 1953; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra,
1952; Critchley, 1955; Williams, 1956; Lukianowicz,
1960; Brugger et al., 1996; 1997; Blanke et al., 2003).
Despite the fact that the patients deny seeing the double
it is often described as “a shadow” or as a “black man”
at the brink of vision (Critchley, 1950; Brugger et al.,
1996; Blanke et al., 2003) that can be associated with
autoscopic phenomena (Lukianowicz, 1960, case 2;
Maack and Mullen, 1983; Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke
et al., 2004, case 3 and 5).
Concerning associated hallucinations, vestibular hal-
lucinations (Brugger et al., 1996, cases 2, 3, and 4;Blanke
et al., 2004, case 5) and body schema disturbances have
been observed quite often, whereas visual, tactile, and
auditory hallucinations were only rarely noted. With
respect to associated neurological deficits, the feeling of
a presence is often associated with hemiparesis or hemi-
plegia (Fe´re´, 1891; Gloning et al., 1957; Nightingale,
1982; Brugger et al., 1996, case 1) as well as somatosen-
sory deficits (Hall, 1918; Gloning et al., 1957; Brugger
et al., 1996, cases 1 and 2). In addition, patients with feel-
ing of a presence may suffer from hemineglect (Critch-
ley, 1979, case b; Brugger et al., 1996, case 1) or
aphasia (Hall, 1918; Brugger et al., 1996, case 1; Blanke
et al., 2003). Often other body schema disturbances such
as limb disconnection, displacement, asomatognosia
(Critchley, 1979, case b; Brugger et al., 1996, cases
1 and 4; Blanke et al., 2003), or somatoparaphrenia are
present (see below). Some patients have also been
reported to suffer from hemianopia (or quadrananopia)
(Critchley, 1979, case b; Brugger et al., 1996, cases 1
and 4; Blanke et al., 2003).
22.5.2. Etiology
Feeling of a presence was described in various neurologi-
cal disturbances, mostly epilepsy (Fe´re´, 1891; Critchley,
1950; 1955;Williams, 1956; Gloning et al., 1957; Critch-
ley, 1979; Hermann and Chhabria, 1980; Benson et al.,
1986; Ardila and Gomez, 1988; Brugger et al., 1996;
Blanke et al., 2003) but also migraine (Lippman, 1953;
Todd and Dewhurst, 1955), neoplasm (He´caen and Ajur-
iaguerra, 1952; Nightingale, 1982; Brugger et al., 1996),
head injury (Lukianowicz, 1960), or acute hypoxia (Sher-
rard, 1978; Messner, 1980). In psychiatry it was
described in patients with schizophrenia (Jaspers, 1913;
Havens, 1962; Mahaluf et al., 1987), depression (Lukia-
nowicz, 1960) and organic psychosis (Nightingale,
1982). However, it may also be present in normal sub-
jects, especially during long periods of loneliness and
exhaustion such as in mountaineers, explorers, sailors,
and castaways (Smythe, 1934; Critchley, 1950; Suedfeld
and Mocellin, 1987; Brugger et al., 1999; Kellehear,
1990).
22.5.3. Anatomy
Several patients have been described in whom feeling
of a presence occurred in association with focal brain
damage. Although it has been observed in patients with
damage to any lobe, it is most often associated with
posterior parietal damage (Kurth, 1941, case 2; Critch-
ley, 1950; 1953; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Glon-
ing et al., 1957; Nightingale, 1982; Brugger et al.,
1996, cases 1, 3 and 4; Blanke et al., 2003). However,
other lobes such as the occipital or temporal lobe were
also implicated, mostly in association with parietal lobe
damage (He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Critchley,
1979, case b; Brugger et al., cases 1, 3, and 4). Finally,
several patients with temporal lobe epilepsy and feel-
ing of a presence have been described (Williams,
1956, case 7; Brugger et al., 1996, case 2).
With regard to predominant hemispheric involve-
ment the reported data are quite divergent. Some
authors found no hemispheric predominance for feeling
of a presence (Brugger et al., 1996), others have sug-
gested a right hemispheric predominance (Fe´re´, 1891;
Kurth, 1941) or left hemispheric predominance (Hall,
1918; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952).
22.5.4. Theoretical considerations
A number of observations support the assumption that
the “presence” is actually related to the patient’s abnor-
mal own body perception. Thus, a feeling of familiarity
or close psychological affinity, as is often found in heau-
toscopy, is frequently mentioned (Critchley, 1955;
Brugger et al., 1996). The patient also experiences the
“presence” in close proximity to their body (Strindberg,
1897; Critchley, 1950; Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke
et al., 2003) and even as imitating the patient’s own
body movements (Jaspers, 1913; Engerth and Hoff,
1929; Brugger et al., 1996). The “presence” is by some
patients described as their “alter ego” (Critchley, 1950;
1955) and patients might even refer explicitly to the
“presence” as their own double (Engerth and Hoff,
1929; Critchley, 1950). Feeling of a presence thus
shares many phenomenological and clinical characteris-
tics with autoscopic phenomena like autoscopic halluci-
nation and heautoscopy and in some patients both
phenomena are observed (Lukianowicz, 1960; Maack
and Mullen, 1983; Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke et al.,
2004). Other patients might find it difficult to clearly
state whether they see their double or whether they feel
a presence.
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22.5.4.1. Autoscopic phenomena
Concerning the relation with autoscopic phenomena,
Menninger-Lerchenthal (1935) referred to the feeling
of a presence as “heautoscopy without optical image”
and Bychowski (1943) also compared the experience
of an autoscopic body or visual double to a “visual feel-
ing of a presence.” Of the autoscopic phenomena, the
feeling of a presence shares many characteristics with
heautoscopy. This concerns the psychological affinity
(Critchley, 1955; Brugger et al., 1996) and the sharing
of action that is reported by some patients between
their bodies and the “presence” (Jaspers, 1913; Engerth
and Hoff, 1929; Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke et al.,
2003). Also, both latter illusory body reduplications
are frequently associated with other body schema dis-
turbances. Temporoparietal damage is often found in
both conditions. Despite these similarities with heauto-
scopy, the feeling of a presence also shares some
aspects with autoscopic hallucination, as both con-
ditions are often lateralized (Fe´re´, 1891; Jaspers,
1913; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lippman, 1953;
Critchley, 1955; Williams, 1956; Lukianowicz, 1960;
Brugger et al., 1996) and may be associated with hemi-
anopia (Critchley, 1979; Brugger et al., 1996; Blanke
et al., 2003). Despite these similarities with autoscopic
phenomena several differences should also be men-
tioned. During the feeling of a presence the double is
not experienced visually and it is for this reason that
we have classified it among nonvisual doubles and
not with autoscopic phenomena. Also, the feeling of a
presence, in the cases that we have analyzed here, is
always lateralized, whereas the autoscopic body in
autoscopic hallucination is only lateralized in 50%
of patients and almost never lateralized in heautoscopy
(Blanke and Mohr, 2005). In addition, the feeling of a
presence is frequently associated with contralesional
deficits in somatosensory and motor function (Brugger
et al., 1996) that have only infrequently been found
in autoscopic phenomena (Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
Based on the shared phenomenological and neuro-
logical characteristics with autoscopic phenomena we
suggest that the feeling of the presence also relates
to a double disintegration of multisensory information
(Blanke et al., 2004). As most characteristics are
shared with heautoscopy for which a primary dys-
function in proprioceptive processing has been pro-
posed (Blanke and Mohr, 2005) and based on the
observation that the feeling of a presence is often asso-
ciated with sensorimotor deficits we suggest that
it is associated with a dysfunction of motor–
proprioceptive mechanisms. This is also compatible
with the reported damage to parietal cortex. In the fol-
lowing section we discuss two clinical conditions that
might be helpful in further unraveling the neural
underpinnings of the feeling of a presence: phantom
limbs and somatoparaphrenia.
22.5.4.2. Phantom limbs
Feeling of a presence has been associated with phantom
limb phenomena bymost authors reporting on the feeling
of a presence (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte,
1939; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Brugger et al.,
1996), which are the vivid impression that amissing body
part is not only still present but in some cases painful
(Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). Phantom phenom-
ena were long considered to derive from irritation in sev-
ered axon terminals in the stump by the presence of scar
tissue and neuromas (for review see Melzack, 1990).
However, there is now a wealth of empirical evidence
demonstrating cortical reorganization following limb
amputation leading to disintegration of multisensory
information (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998) as also
proposed for autoscopic phenomena (Blanke et al.,
2004). Moreover, although phantom limb phenomena
most often occur in pathology, different phantom sensa-
tions and related phenomena might be easily induced in
normal subjects. Examples are the Pinocchio effect
(Lackner, 1988; Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998) or
the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998)
arising through multisensory conflict and relying on
information processing in parietal and frontal cortices
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; 2005). In these own body illusions,
visual sensations and psychological affinity (or feelings
of ownership) are projected onto parts of the external
world through ambiguous proprioceptive–visual input
(Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). It has been specu-
lated that the brain is required to homogenize these differ-
ent multisensory sensations to one coherent body
representation and treat the discrepant or ambiguous
information as noise (Ramachandran et al., 1995). If the
discrepancy is not corrected, a phantom limb (or supernu-
merary phantom limb)may occur. If interference is rather
with central mechanisms that represent the entire body of
the subject, phantoms of the entire body may occur and
this may be experienced as a somatosensory double
(feeling of a presence) or as a visual double (autoscopic
phenomena) (Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger, 2005).
22.5.4.3. Somatoparaphrenia
Previous authors suggested that autoscopic phenomena
might share functional and neural mechanisms with
somatoparaphrenia (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Hoff
and Po¨tzl, 1935/1988; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952;
Gloning et al., 1963; Brugger, 2005). Although, soma-
toparaphrenia most often affects only certain (mostly
contralesional) body parts such as the hand and arm of
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the patient, we here present several neurological cases
who reveal that somatoparaphrenia may also concern
the contralesional half of a patient’s body and even their
entire body.We will draw especially on these latter cases
to highlight some potential similarities between the feel-
ing of a presence and somatoparaphrenia.
The term somatoparaphrenia was coined by Josef
Gerstmann (1942) in an attempt to isolate it from two
other phenomena, anosognosia and asomatognosia,
that were often associated in patients with visuospatial
neglect. (In Gerstmann’s terminology asomatognosia
was called autosomatoagnosia.) Gerstmann defined
somatoparaphrenia as “specific psychic elaborations
(marked by formation of illusions, confabulations, and
delusions) with respect to the affected members or side
of the body.” Following Gerstmann’s definition, soma-
toparaphrenia should be distinguished from asomatog-
nosia that he defined as the patient’s “imperception of
the affected limbs or body half, in various degrees from
simple forgetting to obstinate denial of their existence”.
Here we will not discuss the third symptom that Gerst-
mann discussed, anosognosia. Anosognosia has been
defined in many variants, but the most common and
most related in the present context is neurological
patients’ unawareness or nonexperience of contrale-
sional hemiplegia (Babinski, 1923; Gerstmann, 1942;
Cutting, 1978). Somatoparaphrenia is characterized by
a number of apparently strange perceptions and beliefs
with respect to the patient’s extremities or body half of
which the most common are that patients believe that
their own arm or body half belongs to another person
or that they have a third arm (supernumerary phantom
limb; Halligan et al., 1993). Gerstmann’s classifica-
tion was only partly adapted by subsequent authors
especially with respect to the distinction between aso-
matognosia and somatoparaphrenia (He´caen and Ajur-
iaguerra, 1952; Feinberg et al., 1990). This is probably
due to the many intermediate forms as well as the pre-
sence of asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia in the
same patient (He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952). Here,
we will concentrate on patients with somatoparaphrenia
that affect the entire body in order to stress its potential
link with illusory reduplications of the entire body.
Po¨tzl (1925), Hoff and Po¨tzl (1935/1988), Mennin-
ger-Lerchenthal (1935), and later Gerstmann (1942)
and Gloning et al. (1963) proposed that somatoparaph-
renia may not only affect a limb or body part, but also a
body half of the patient and even lead to limb or whole
body reduplication.
For instance, Lhermitte (1939, p.130) described
somatoparaphrenia in a patient with visuospatial neglect
due to right hemisphere brain damage who perceived
her left own hand as the hand of somebody else. Yet,
as many of these patients, she also claimed that this hand
belonged to (the body) of a person that is close by and
that she assumed to be in her hospital room. Most often
patients with somatoparaphrenia will thus claim that
their own extremity is not just an unknown extremity,
but the extremity of another person. And this extremity
belongs generally to a neighbor in the hospital room
(Lhermitte, 1939), a doctor (Gerstmann, 1942), the hus-
band (Assal, 1983), or other family members or friends
Case Study 22.6
Feeling of a presence associated with
somatoparaphrenia
Po¨tzl (1925)
In addition to somatoparaphrenia this patient also felt
the presence of another person in his bed (feeling of a
presence) suggesting that both phenomena might
share functional and neural mechanisms.
This 56-year-old male patient repeatedly reported
that his left hand and arm belonged to somebody
else. This was especially the case when his hand
was held in front of him and he mentioned that it
was the hand of a stranger that he sees, probably
belonging to another patient in the room. He also
stated that “I don’t know how this hand got here”
or “the hand seems so long, so lifeless, as dead as
a snake.” He also claimed that there was an unknown
person that was lying in his bed (to his left side) and
that this person wants to push him out of the bed.
This 56-year-old male patient suffered from hemor-
rhagic brain damage to the right inferior parietal lobule
including supramarginal and angular gyri, parts of the
superior temporal gyrus and insula, as well as underly-
ing white matter. Autopsy also revealed an older right
thalamic lesion. The neurological examination
revealed left-sided plegia and hemianesthesia without
hemianopia and severe hemineglect associated with
anosognosia.
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(Weinstein et al. 1954, case 1). Thus, these patients
indirectly attribute this somatoparaphrenic hand to
another person in spatial (and emotional) proximity.
Other patients have mentioned the presence of another
person that is close by more directly. Thus, Po¨tzl
(1925; patient #1; Case Study 22.6) described a patient
with left-sided hemiplegia and somatoparaphrenia who
not only claimed that his left arm belonged to an
unknown person, but also that there was another person
lying in his bed to his left and that this person tried to
push him out of the bed (p.119). Po¨tzl (1925) described
a second patient with left-sided hemiplegia and somato-
paraphrenia also claiming that his left arm belonged to a
stranger. As this patient also claimed that there was a
supernumerary left arm (see also Ehrenwald, 1930;
Halligan et al., 1993), Po¨tzl (1925) and later Hoff and
Po¨tzl (1935/1988) argued that reduplication of an extre-
mity and of an entire body in patients with somatopar-
aphrenia may share functional mechanisms and that
the delusional other in somatoparaphrenia is closely
related to the feeling of a presence. Further such cases
with somatoparaphrenia and the feeling of a presence
can be found in the literature. Engerth and Hoff (1929)
describe a 71-year-old man with left-sided hypoesthe-
sia, hemianopia (with hemianopic hallucinations), and
anosognosia who experienced a constant left-sided per-
son who was most often localized next or behind the
patient. In addition, the patient noted that this person
had the patient’s posture and size and only appeared
when the patient was standing or walking. This
dependence on posture and action of the patient has also
been described in recently reported patients with feeling
of a presence (Blanke et al., 2003) and, notably, heauto-
scopy (Blanke and Mohr, 2005). Lhermitte (1939)
described a 72-year-old female patient with left-sided
hemiplegia and hemianesthesia that claimed that her left
body half belonged to another person that was lying in
the same bed as her. More such patients with the asso-
ciation of somatoparaphrenia and the feeling of a pre-
sence were reported by Anton (1898), Zingerle (1913),
Halligan (1995), and Cereda et al. (2002). The fact that
this “stranger’s body” is experienced in a highly realistic
fashion is underlined by the fact that many of these
patients are afraid or annoyed by the presence of this
stranger. By trying to throw them out of the bed these
patients often find themselves on the floor. This diffi-
culty to distinguish between self and other is reminis-
cent of severe cases of heautoscopy (see Case Study
22.3) where the patient desperately tries to get rid of
the unwanted stranger by often very dangerous (self-
mutilating) actions. Some patients not only report sen-
sorimotor doubles, but report seeing their double (auto-
scopic phenomena) on the contralesional side (Hoff,
1931). Still other patients may even describe that
another person’s body (such as their father) has partly
invaded one half of their body (Nightingale, 1982, Case
Study 22.7).
Based on these observations and the association
of somatoparaphrenia with parietal lobe damage we
argue that doubles that are reported by patients with
Case Study 22.7
Somatoparaphrenia
Nightingale (1982)
Somatoparaphrenia is mostly confined to the patient’s
upper extremity and patients claim that their generally
plegic arm belongs to another (most often familiar)
person. The present case illustrates that somatoparaph-
renia may also affect an entire half of the patient’s
body and may be associated with illusory reduplica-
tion of the entire body.
A 46-year-old right-handedman felt that the left side
of his body was different from the right half. He
explained that the left side of his body had slipped
behind the right side so that the latter becamemore pro-
minent than the former. Moreover, the left side seemed
to him somewhat evil and controlled by external agents
(such as the devil or his father). The right side of his
body was perceived as “self” and “good.” These two
sides were in constant conflict about his behavior. The
left body side tried to instruct him to perform evil acts
that his “self” or right body side felt to be incorrect.
These experiences were accompanied by the patient
hearing compelling voices, coming from his left extra-
corporeal space. Rarely, he experienced left-sided com-
plex visual hallucinations and the presence of another
person to his left (feeling of a presence).
This patient suffered from complex partial seizures
with secondary generalization since the age of 30 years.
Despite removal of a parasagittal meningioma that was
adjacent to right parietal cortex and anticonvulsant
treatment the patient continued to have frequent sei-
zures. The patient is known for a period of moderate
depression following the death of his father at the age
of 40 years. There were no signs of schizophrenia.
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somatoparaphrenia may relate phenomenologically,
functionally, and anatomically to the feeling of a
presence and accordingly also with other own body
reduplications. As somatoparaphrenia is strongly asso-
ciated with right hemispheric brain damage, whereas
the feeling of a presence is encountered with damage
to either hemisphere, it is likely that the mostly left-
sided sensorimotor doubles in somatoparaphrenia and
right-sided sensorimotor doubles relate to different
functional mechanisms (Brugger et al., 1996; 1997).
This is also suggested by clinical differences between
right- and left-sided sensorimotor doubles with respect
to etiology and clinical evolution.
22.5.4.4. Delusional misidentifications syndromes
Finally, some authors (Signer, 1987) have proposed that
the feeling of a presence (as well as autoscopic phenom-
ena) may also relate functionally to delusional misidenti-
fications syndromes concerning the patient’s body and
self, either as imposter or double. These include the sub-
jective doubles syndrome (Christodoulou, 1978a; Case
Study 22.8) and as a subtype of the Capgras syndrome
(Berson, 1983; Kamanitz et al., 1989; Silva and Leong,
1991; Silva et al., 1993; Feinberg and Roane, 2005).
Patients with the subjective doubles syndrome are con-
vinced that another person is posing as the patient,
whereas patients with Capgras syndrome may claim that
not only other persons, but also they themselves are
replaced by identical substitutes (Capgras and Reboul-
Lachaux, 1923; Kamanitz et al., 1989; Silva and Leong,
1991; Silva et al., 1993). Other forms may also include
patients who fail to recognize themselves in a mirror
(He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ajuriaguerra et al.,
1963; Foley and Breslau, 1982) and, in addition, mistake
their mirror reflection for an imposter (Gluckman, 1968;
Feinberg and Shapiro, 2000).
Other authors thought it important to distinguish
between delusional misidentification syndromes and
autoscopic phenomena based on several clinical differ-
ences (Sims, 1986). Thus, Simsmentions that autoscopy
(or autoscopic phenomena in general) (1) has a percep-
tual element, which is generally absent in delusional
misidentification syndromes, (2) that the autoscopic
patient experiences the double as “their real self”
whereas the Capgras patient is convinced that the double
is an imposter, and that (3) autoscopy is a pseudohallu-
cination, which delusional misidentification syndromes
are not. Yet, as discussed in this review, we would like
to underline here that only some illusory reduplications
are experienced as pseudohallucinations (autoscopic
hallucinations) and the double is only rarely experi-
enced as the location of the “real self.” Weinstein
Case Study 22.8
Subjective doubles syndrome
Christodoulou (1978b)
Patients suffering from subjective doubles syndrome
claim that another person has taken on the same appear-
ance as the patient, but has kept the other person’s char-
acter traits and leads a life of their own. Some patients
stated that several others have taken on their appear-
ance. Other patients claim that another personwith their
habitual appearance has taken the same personality as
the patient. Both subtypes are probably related to the
more common syndromes of Capgras and Fre´goli.
An 18-year-old woman developed insomnia, agita-
tion, depression, loosening of associations, lack of
sexual inhibition, and experience of de´ja` ve´cu. Yet,
she also stated that a female neighbor acquired physi-
cal characteristics identical to the patient’s character-
istics. The subjective double was described as having
the “same face, same build, same clothes, same every-
thing.” The patient also stated that the neighbor
accomplished this by wearing special make-up, a
wig, and a mask. In another episode, while the patient
was hospitalized, she insisted that at least two other
female patients had transformed themselves into her
by taking on the patient’s appearance. The patient even
attacked one of them trying to “pull the mask” off the
other patient’s face. In a letter to her father she
explained: “In here there is a girl as fat and as tall as
I am. At night when everyone is asleep, she puts on a
wig and a mask and walks from room to room stealing
things in order to incriminate me. One night I woke up
and saw her with my own eyes. It is unfortunate that
due to my confusion I failed to run to the window to
shout to the people, ‘look here, this is me, and this is
my double with a wig and a mask.’”
The patient had an unspecified seizure disorder
since the age of 8 years. Before the above described
hospitalization her psychiatric history was unremark-
able. A paternal uncle suffered from a paranoid schizo-
phrenia. Neurological examination, routine laboratory
check, cerebrospinal fluid and computed tomography
were normal.
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et al. (1954) and, more recently, Signer (1987) even
speculated about common mechanisms between redu-
plicated body parts, bodies, and paramnesias for place
and event (Ro¨hrenbach and Landis, 1995). Yet, although
it is likely that some common mechanisms may be
involved between delusional misidentication syn-
dromes, delusional mirror recognition and misidentifica-
tion, and paramnesias, we have not elaborated this any
further here due to the many clinical differences of the
latter conditions with illusory own body reduplications.
In conclusion, these observations on the feeling
of a presence suggest that it shares phenomenological,
functional, and neural mechanisms with visual doubles
(especially heautoscopy) and delusional doubles (soma-
toparaphrenia) and is probably due to multisensory
mechanisms and sensorimotor disintegration. It might
thus be speculated that the investigation of these three
conditions through detailed neuropsychological exami-
nation is likely to further our understanding of the
central mechanisms of own body representations, self
processing, and self–other distinction as previous re-
search helped elucidating the nature of (supernumerary)
phantoms limbs.
22.6. Auditory doubles
22.6.1. Hearing of a presence
Are there auditory doubles? Have there been reports of
neurological patients who claim to have the highly rea-
listic experience of hearing a double of themselves or
another person in extracorporeal space? Menninger-
Lerchenthal (1935) and Gloning et al. (1963) have sug-
gested that illusory own body reduplications should
also exist in the auditory domain, yet have not pre-
sented clinical evidence for this nor further developed
this hypothesis.
Audition like vision, balance, and somatosensation
is involved in the construction of the body image
(La`davas, 2002; Blanke et al., 2003; Pavani et al.,
2003; Holmes and Spence, 2004). Moreover, electro-
physiological studies in the macaque at the subcortical
level (Stein et al., 1993) and in parietal and temporal
cortex (Duhamel et al., 1998; Bremmer et al., 2001;
Schroter-Kunhardt, 2002) suggest that several cerebral
areas combine auditory signals with tactile, propriocep-
tive, and visual information in a coordinated reference
frame for personal and extrapersonal space. This has also
been found by neuroimagingwork (Bremmer et al., 2001;
Foxe et al., 2002; Holmes and Spence, 2004) and beha-
vioral studies in brain damaged and healthy subjects
(La`davas et al., 2001; La`davas, 2002; Pavani et al.,
2003; Holmes and Spence, 2004) in humans. In light of
these findings and the earlier speculations by Menninger-
Lerchenthal (1935) and Gloning et al. (1963), it might
thus be hypothesized that neurological damage to tem-
poroparietal areas might not only lead to visual and
sensorimotor doubles, but also to auditory doubles.
22.6.2. Clinical presentation, etiology, anatomy
Auditory hallucinations cover a variety of elementary
experiences such as hearing noises or sounds (humming,
buzzing, tapping, ringing, etc) and complex experiences
such as voices, conversations, or music (Cole et al.,
2002). Complex auditory hallucinations are most often
characterized by the hearing of a voice or voices that
are generally called auditory verbal hallucinations.
About 70% of schizophrenic and a variety of other psy-
chiatric and neurological patients suffer from auditory
verbal hallucinations (Stephane et al., 2001). Voices
during auditory verbal hallucinations are most often
experienced as addressing the subject directly and called
2nd person auditory verbal hallucinations (Frith, 1996).
Less frequently voices during auditory verbal hallucina-
tions may be experienced as the subject’s own voice (1st
person auditory verbal hallucinations) or as hearing two
or more other people taking to each other (3rd person
auditory verbal hallucinations). The content of auditory
verbal hallucinations may vary as does the localization
of the voice which maybe at varying positions in perso-
nal or extrapersonal space. In addition, most patients
experience these variably localized auditory verbal hal-
lucinations as voices and not as a present person that
speaks to them. Auditory verbal hallucinations in neuro-
logical patients have been reported most often in sponta-
neous seizures and been localized to the temporal cortex
(Bancaud, 1987). Auditory verbal hallucinations may
also be evoked directly by electrical cortical stimulation
in patients with pharmacoresistant epilepsy (Penfield
and Perot, 1963; Halgren et al., 1978; 1983), which
has the advantage of greater spatial precision and
experimental control. The electrically induced experi-
ences were reported to be highly similar to those
described by psychiatric patients (2nd person auditory
verbal hallucinations) andmostly characterized by hear-
ing voices inside the head or at varying locations. Yet
very few patients reported a precise localization of the
auditory source as well as hearing a talking person. Pen-
field and Perot (1963) reported this in two of 21 patients
with stimulation-induced and seizure-induced auditory
verbal hallucinations (case 12 and 29). Both epileptic
patients reported that they not just heard a localized
“voice,” but heard a physically present person in the
contralateral space or in the backspace that spoke to
them. Moreover, the “heard persons” had a precise loca-
tion and distance from the patient’s body and in both
patients either the feeling of a presence (case 12) or
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the visual experience of a second body (case 29) were
noted as well. One may wonder whether this was an
autoscopic body, although this is not further detailed.
Thus, a 24-year-old woman (case 12) had seizures since
the age of 20 years characterized by a sensation (of
something or somebody) in her back, complex auditory
and visual hallucinations, and fear followed by second-
ary generalization. She described hearing a man that
spoke behind her and that she could not understand what
he was saying. Her seizure focus was localized to the left
parietal lobe (arteriovenous malformation). Electrical
cortical stimulations at the left posterior aspects of the
superior temporal gyrus (at the temporoparietal junc-
tion) induced hearing of a presence described as “I could
hear someone talking” and “there was [somebody] talk-
ing or murmuring, but I could not understand it.” During
further stimulations she detailed that she heard a man
who was standing behind her and who was once identi-
fied as her father. Note that somatoparaphrenic doubles
or extremities are also often identified as relatives of the
patient. The second patient of Penfield and Perot (1963)
with hearing of a presence was a 25-year-old man (case
29) who suffered from seizures since the age of 19 years
characterized by vertigo and auditory verbal hallu-
cinations (a voice calling him by his first name).
(Interestingly, several authors have suggested that 2nd
person auditory verbal hallucination of being called by
one’s first name relate to autoscopic phenomena (Men-
ninger-Lerchenthal, 1935, pp. 131–132; Schilder,
1914). See Perrin et al. (2005) for a recent neuroimaging
study on the neurobiology of hearing one’s first name.)
His seizure focus was localized to the perisylvian region
including temporal and parietal cortex (arteriovenous
malformation). Electrical cortical stimulations at the
right posterior (and middle) aspects of the superior tem-
poral gyrus induced hearing of a presence. This was
described as “it is just like someone [is] whispering in
my left ear” and “again someone [is] trying to speak to
me, a single person,” “I could not understand what he
said.” Interestingly stimulations at the superior temporal
gyrus also lead to the visual impression seeing of a per-
son in front of him (“someone was there in front of me”).
Other stimulations at sites on the superior temporal
gyrus and middle temporal gyrus led to different audi-
tory hallucinations and experiential phenomena. Hear-
ing of a presence was also reported by Gloor et al.
(1982, case 3). More recently, Blanke et al. (2003) also
described a patient with hearing of a presence probably
due to epileptic seizures following hemorrhagic brain
damage at the left TPJ (Case Study 22.9).
Case Study 22.9
Hearing of a presence
Blanke et al. (2003)
A right-handed 65-year-old nun reported complex
auditory hallucinations characterized by the impres-
sion of hearing for various periods one or two people
talking behind her. During one especially impressive
and long period she was sitting in the hospital church
when she suddenly had the feeling that she heard two
“people” whispering behind her. Both “people” were
sitting on a bench approximately one meter behind her
and on her right. She could not understand what they
were saying. She could not indicate the gender of these
“people” or any other character of their voices. While
turning around she noticed that there was no one sitting
behind her. Yet, after she turned her head back forward,
she continued to hear two people whispering behind her
back on the left side. This persisted until she left the hos-
pital church. She reported similar experiences in her
hospital room (and after hospital discharge for a period
of several years). These instances were always charac-
terized by the auditory perception as if someone was
suddenly standing behind her and to her right and
talking in an incomprehensible manner to her. In addi-
tion, she suffered from simple auditory hallucinations
characterized by humming or buzzing also localized
on the right side (either lateral or behind her) or bilater-
ally. She also experienced several times a day a “sha-
dow” on her right side (feeling of a presence) and
other right side dyssomatognosic illusions.
The patient developed complex partial seizures with
secondary generalization due to a hematoma at the left
parietotemporo-occipital junction at the age of 60 years.
Whenhospitalized for thehearingof a presence, theneu-
rological examination revealed right-sided auditory spa-
tial agnosia (deficit in the localization of auditory
targets), moderate aphasia with semantic and phonolo-
gical paraphasias, severe alexia, andmoderate agraphia.
Therewere no signs of apraxia or of visual agnosia.MRI
did not show any new lesion, but EEG revealed frequent
interictal epileptic activity characterized by spike-
waves, sharp waves and slow waves over the left mid-
to-posterior temporal region. In one instance, rhythmic
discharges over the occipitotemporal regionwere noted.
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With respect to the underlying anatomy, Penfield and
Perot (1963) localized auditory verbal hallucinations to
the superior and middle temporal gyri of either hemi-
sphere with a left-sided predominance. Others have con-
firmed these findings, but also induced auditory verbal
hallucinations by electrical cortical stimulation of infer-
ior temporal and mesial temporal structures (Penfield
and Perot, 1963; Halgren et al., 1978; 1983). The three
cases of hearing of a presence are concordant with the
findings by Penfield and Perot (1963).
22.6.3. Theoretical considerations
The four cases with hearing of a presence (Penfield and
Perot, 1963; Gloor et al., 1982; Blanke et al., 2003)
thus closely resemble each other and are in contrast to
classically reported auditory verbal hallucinations in
epileptic patients. In addition, they suggest that HP
can phenomenologically be dissociated from other
auditory verbal hallucinations. Indeed, psychotic
patients often find it difficult to say whether the
“voice” is inside or outside their head (Nayani and
David, 1996; David, 1999) and mostly experience audi-
tory verbal hallucinations inside their head or body
(Junginger and Frame, 1985; Chadwick and Lowe,
1994; Nayani and David, 1996). This was also found
for most stimulation-induced auditory verbal hallucina-
tions in epileptic patients (Penfield and Perot, 1963)
and differs from the phenomenology described by these
four patients described here who localized a talking
person (or persons) at a precise location in their back-
space. This auditory lateralization and auditory dis-
tance from the patient’s body was corroborated by
neuropsychological findings showing that the heard
person(s) were localized on the side where spatial audi-
tory agnosia and other dyssomatognosic sensations
were found (Blanke et al., 2003). Although, some psy-
chotic patients are able to describe characteristics of
the voice such as content, affective tone, and identity,
they usually lack spatial attributes such as location in
extrapersonal space (Junginger and Frame, 1985;
Chadwick and Lowe, 1994). This has even led to the
proposition that auditory verbal hallucinations of psy-
chotic origin classically lack any localization (Strauss,
1962). Even if in rare instances external auditory verbal
hallucinations may be lateralized and localized in psy-
chiatric patients, their spatial attributes are extremely
variable. They are experienced at variable distances
and variable locations from the patients’ bodies and
often described at delusional locations (Chadwick and
Lowe, 1994; Nayani and David, 1996; David, 1999).
Based on these differences and neuropsychological
findings, Blanke et al. (2003) suggested that the hearing
of a presence might relate to auditory–spatial disorders
rather than auditory disorders (related to the identifica-
tion of the nonspatial characteristics of a sound). The
coappearance of hearing of a presence and feeling of a
presence in three of the here presented patients as well
as previously reported patients with feeling of a pre-
sence (Jaspers, 1913; Critchley, 1954; Gru¨sser and
Landis, 1991; Brugger et al., 1996) also suggests their
close functional relationship. It could be argued that
the hearing of a presence is not a disorder of own body
perception (referring to disorders in the perception and
cognition of the patient’s own body), since these four
patients never experienced their “own voice” or their
“own body” as talking behind themselves. Similar argu-
ments have been proposed for the feeling of a presence.
Yet, as noted by Brugger et al. (1996) and others (Jas-
pers, 1913; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935), although
patients suffering from feeling of a presence also do
not feel their own body at two locations at the same time,
the felt (or heard) body is always experienced in a very
persuasive way (at the fringe of vision) and is often asso-
ciated with a strong feeling of a strangeness towards
one’s own body (depersonalization; Dening and Ber-
rios, 1994; Brugger et al., 1997) and a psychological
affinity with the felt body. In addition, in rare instances
the feeling of a presence is associated with autoscopy
(Brugger et al., 1996; 1997) suggesting a close link
between visual and nonvisual body reduplications. Sev-
eral functional and neural mechanisms have been pro-
posed to account for auditory verbal hallucinations.
Research proposed that auditory verbal hallucinations
might be due to either an auditory dysfunction (McKay
et al., 2000), a language dysfunction (Hoffmann, 1986;
Frith and Done, 1988), a failure to monitor inner speech
(McGuire et al., 1995), or dysfunctional reality monitor-
ing (Bentall, 1990). Based on the rare, but concordant
phenomenological and neuropsychological data in
patients with hearing of a presence we speculate that it
might result from a paroxysmal failure to integrate
auditory body-related information with somatosensory
and visual body-related information. This information
is needed in order to create neural representations of
personal and peripersonal auditory space (di Pellegrino
et al., 1997; La`davas et al., 2001; Farne` and La`davas,
2002 Au13) and the mechanisms of hearing of a presence
are probably related to, but distinct from, mechanisms
causing more common forms of auditory verbal halluci-
nations. These data suggest that within the group of
illusory own body reduplications that concern the whole
body, one should discern between visual doubles (auto-
scopic phenomena), sensorimotor doubles (feeling of a
presence), and auditory doubles (hearing of a presence:
the persuasive hearing of a person nearby).
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22.7. Negative doubles
Negative heautoscopy is defined as the failure to see
one’s own body either when looked at directly or in a
mirror (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lhermitte,
1951; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Devinsky et al.,
1989a; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al.,
1997). Although negative heautoscopy is not an own
body reduplication in the strict sense it is classically
grouped among autoscopic phenomena. This is due to
the fact that negative heautoscopy sharesmany phenom-
enological characteristics with other forms of auto-
scopic phenomena. Most authors mentioned negative
heautoscopy only briefly with respect to other forms of
autoscopic phenomena (Lhermitte, 1951; He´caen and
Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Devinsky et al., 1989a; Dening
and Berrios, 1994), some mentioned that negative heau-
toscopy is a distinct autoscopic phenomenon (Bradford,
2005; Blanke and Mohr, 2005), whereas others have
included it more prominently (Gru¨sser and Landis,
1991; Brugger et al., 1997; Brugger, 2005). This may
largely be due (as for inner heautoscopy) to the fact that
case descriptions, especially recent ones in neurological
patients, are rare. Yet a few reports of negative heauto-
scopy due to focal brain damage do exist and as we will
argue in the remainder of this section that negative
heautoscopy may have functional links with other
neurological conditions such as asomatognosia and
depersonalization.
22.7.1. Clinical presentation
The most well-known description has probably been
given by Guy de Maupassant in his short story “Le
Horla” (Maupassant, 1886/1961) and was quoted by
Lhermitte, Critchley, and many other neurological
authors. After describingmany instances of persecution,
fear, and hallucinations Maupassant writes “I could not
see myself in the mirror! It was empty, transparent, deep
[. . .] I was not reflected in it [. . .] and I was standing in
front of it.” A medical history with negative heauto-
scopy has been described by von Stockert (1934). This
patient was “alarmed by the sudden impression of the
left half of his body being absent. When he would look
at himself with horror, he would indeed notice that the
left half was not there. At these moments he felt some-
what comforted by the visual confirmation [of not see-
ing his left body] of his somatosensory impressions”
(cited in Brugger et al., 1997). Interestingly, this patient
claimed not only that he could no longer see his own left
Case Study 22.10
Negative heautoscopy
Arzy et al. (in press Au3)
Negative heautoscopy refers to failure to perceive
one’s own body either in a mirror or when looked at
directly. Given the rarity of negative HAS for the
entire body we detail here the experience of a recently
reported patient in whom negative heautoscopy only
affected one extremity. We suggest that the involved
pathomechanisms are similar and might further relate
to those involved in asomatognosia.
A 51-year-old, right-handed woman, without neu-
rological or psychiatric antecedents reported that for
several minutes she did not see her left arm and left
hand any more while she did normally see all other
parts of her body. While at work she suddenly felt
dizzy and noticed that parts of her left arm had “disap-
peared.” She thus did not see her left upper extremity
from her elbow on downwards. She was quite frigh-
tened, but realized to her astonishment that she could
see the table on which she had rested her “disap-
peared” arm as if she could see the table “through the
left arm.” She saw her left arm only above her elbow
where she saw a clear cut border. In addition, she could
not move her left arm or hand while being normally
able to move her right arm. She noted no changes with
respect to any other body parts. Only after several min-
utes did she experience that her left arm and hand
changed again being progressively “restored” until
the arm was “complete” again and occluding the table
beneath it. Only some minutes later was she able to
move her arm normally again.
The neurological examination showed moderate
left-sided hypoesthesia for arm and lower face, a mild
executive deficit in Luria’s alternating sequences test,
verbal semantic fluency, and in the mental rotation of
human body parts. There were no signs of visuospa-
tial neglect. Magnetic resonance imaging showed
two small ischemic lesions in the premotor and the
primary motor cortices.
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body half, but also noted that, when looking at other
people that they lacked the right side of their bodies.
Sollier (1903a) reports a case of negative heautoscopy
in a 14-year-old hysteric patient and Magri and Moc-
chetti (1967) describe a 61-year-old patient who suf-
fered from complex partial seizures and reported that
he could not see his mirror reflection anymore. Brugger
et al. (1997) note that some patients have been described
who suffer from negative heautoscopy in association
with other autoscopic phenomena. A more recent
patient was briefly mentioned by Brugger (2005; unpub-
lished observation). This female patient suffered from
panic attacks consisting of episodes during which she
could not see the left half of her body (negative heauto-
scopy for her left hemibody). EEG revealed abortive
spike-wave complexes over the right parietocentral area
and carbamazepine treatment seemed to have abolished
all symptoms. Other patients have been described that
noted that parts of their body were detached, missing,
or invisible with respect to the rest of their body. Indeed,
Gloning et al. (1954) described a patient with simple
partial seizures and left-sided sensorimotor deficits
who noted that during his simple partial seizures his
right body half was one meter in front of his normally
localized left-sided body. Brugger et al. (2006) describe
a patient who noticed that his body was split along the
midline with an empty area between both body parts.
Finally, Blanke et al. (2002; 2004) described a patient
who during an out-of-body experience only saw the
lower parts of her body (autoscopic body). Whereas this
partial vision of the autoscopic body is rather rare during
out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy, it is quite fre-
quent during autoscopic hallucinations and concerns
generally the lower body (for review see Blanke and
Mohr, 2005). It might thus be proposed that these latter
negative illusory own body experiences reflect related
functional and neural mechanisms.
The authors argued that this patient’s negative
experience shares many characteristics with asomatog-
nosia and may be defined as a visual form of asomatog-
nosia. Extending Arzy et al.’s (in pressAu4 ) argumentation
to the entire body (as in negative heautoscopy), one
might argue that the entire visually perceived body
may also be missing, disappear, or “fall out of corpor-
eal awareness.” The reviewed cases suggest that nega-
tive heautoscopy may affect the entire body, but mostly
seems to affect only one half of the patient’s body or
only a certain body part (mostly the upper extremity;
Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991; Brugger et al., 1997; Brad-
ford, 2005). It should also be noted that the autoscopic
body in autoscopic phenomena is not infrequently seen
as missing certain body parts (Noue¨t, 1923; Genner,
1947; Maximov, 1973; Blanke et al., 2002; 2004; for
review see Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
22.7.2. Etiology and anatomy
Bradford (2005) writes that negative heautoscopy is an
“instance of conversion reaction, a hysteria driven and
attenuated form of asomatognosia.” Critchley (1953,
p. 240) stated that negative heautoscopy is “very rare”
and may be an “expression of a psychotic illness.” Yet,
a few cases due to focal brain damage have also been
reported. Although most lesions affected the right hemi-
sphere, lesion sites included parietal and frontal cortex,
thalamus, and splenium. For instance, von Stockert’s
(1934) patient suffered from a right-sided thalamic
tumor that invaded the splenium and the patient
described byMagri and Mocchetti (1967) suffered from
complex partial seizures with secondary generalization
due to a calcification in her right parietal lobe. The
patient reported by Arzy et al. (in press Au5) suffered from
two small ischemic lesions in right motor and premotor
cortex and Brugger’s patient (2005) showed abnormal-
ities over the right centroparietal region.
22.7.3. Theoretical considerations
22.7.3.1. Asomatognosia
These abovementioned cases suggest that negative
heautoscopy might share some functional mechanisms
with asomatognosia (Magri and Mocchetti, 1967;
Devinsky et al., 1989a). This might have also been the
reason why Devinsky et al. (1989) Au14and Magri and Moc-
chetti (1967) proposed the name asomatoscopy for
negative HAS. Patients with asomatognosia generally
describe that an arm or leg or an entire body half seems
to be “missing” or that “the affected body parts may
seem to disappear or to fall out of corporeal awareness”
(Critchley, 1953, pp. 237–238). Evidence from patients
with focal brain damage suggests that asomatognosia is
linked to posterior parietal (or temporoparietal) lesions,
especially in the right hemisphere (Critchley, 1953;
He´caen and David, 1945; David et al., 1946; Feinberg
et al., 1990; Leiguarda et al., 1993; Feinberg et al.,
2000; Sierra et al. 2002; So and Schauble, 2004).
Experimental findings in patients with asomatognosia
are rare, but several case studies have shown that asoma-
tognosia may be modified by touching the “missing”
body part or by looking at it suggesting multisensory
mechanisms in asomatognosia and autoscopic phenom-
ena (Critchley, 1953; Newport et al., 2001). Thus an
asomatognosic patient described by Carp (1952) lost
her sensation for the right half of her body and had to
verify continuously its existence by looking at it.
Whereas the missing body part in asomatognosia is gen-
erally experienced as a somatosensory loss (Critchley,
1953; He´caen and David, 1945; David et al., 1946; Fein-
berg et al., 1990; Leiguarda et al., 1993; Feinberg et al.,
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2000; Sierra et al. 2002; So and Schauble, 2004) the
abovementioned cases of von Stockert (1934) and Arzy
et al. (in pressAu6 ) suggest that asomatognosia may also
exist as a visual loss. One might thus classify these cases
either as partial negative heautoscopy or as visual aso-
matognosia. Khazaal et al. (2005) considered asoma-
tognosia a special form of hemi-depersonalization
(quoted after Brugger, 2005). The association between
depersonalization and negative heautoscopy as well as
other forms of autoscopic phenomena will be briefly
considered next.
22.7.3.2. Depersonalization
Many authors have pointed out that autoscopic phenom-
ena (except autoscopic hallucinations) are often asso-
ciated with depersonalization (Menninger-Lerchenthal,
1935; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Leischner,
1961; Devinsky et al., 1989a; Gru¨sser and Landis,
1991; Dening and Berrios, 1994; Brugger et al., 1997).
Depersonalization is one of the four major dissociative
disorders and defined as “an alteration in the experience
of the self so that one feels detached from, and as if one
is an outside observer of, one’s mental processes or
body” (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association).
Dissociation including depersonalization is most com-
mon after severe stress as for example in military com-
bat and automobile accidents (DSM-IV, American
Psychiatric Association) that are also common precipi-
tating factors of autoscopic phenomena (Devinsky
et al., 1989a). As stated recently by Simeon (2004) not
much is known about the neuroanatomical mechanisms
involved in depersonalization. Penfield and Jaspers
(1954), Gloor et al., (1982), and Devinsky and collea-
gues linked autoscopic phenomena (Devinsky et al.,
1989a) and dissociative states (including depersonaliza-
tion) (Devinsky et al., 1989b) to temporal lobe structures
and epilepsy. Sierra and Berrios (1998) postulated that
depersonalization is related to a widespread disturbance
including prefrontal hyperactivation, limbic hypoacti-
vation, and parietal dysfunction (Sierra et al., 2002).
Simeon et al. (2000) linked activation at the right TPJ
including right middle and superior temporal gyri,
the right inferior parietal lobule as well as left occipital
cortex to depersonalization.
Patients with autoscopic phenomena often suffer
from depersonalization probably by being confronted
with the experience of seeing one or more second
own body or bodies in extracorporeal space (autoscopic
hallucinations, heautoscopy, polyopic heautoscopy), of
having the sensation of disembodiment (OBE), or of
not feeling or seeing their body anymore (negative
heautocopy, asomatognosia). Depersonalization may
be especially strong when the patient does not see his
own body (or body parts) through direct inspection or
as reflected in a mirror as was the case in the patient
reported by Arzy et al. (in press Au7). This was also men-
tioned by Critchley (1953, p. 240) who stated that
especially negative heautoscopy is “a severe example
of the depersonalization syndrome.” In conclusion,
these observations on negative heautoscopy suggest that
it shares several phenomenological, functional, and
neural mechanisms with autoscopic phenomena and
asomatognosia.We speculate that negative heautoscopy
is also due to multisensory disintegration in parietal or
temporoparietal cortex, especially in the right hemi-
sphere, and that its neurological investigation might
shed some light on depersonalization and dissociative
states.
22.8. Conclusion
In science the most challenging phenomena are often
the ones we take for granted in our everyday lives.
Excellent examples are the self and the experienced spa-
tial unity between self and body and thus the everyday
experience of being spatially embodied. Both folk and
psychological notions are challenged by the experience
of one or more second own bodies or doubles that neuro-
logical patients describe in all their multisensory forms.
The reviewed evidence from neurological patients
experiencing these striking dissociations between self
and body suggests that AP are culturally invariant phe-
nomena, which can be investigated scientifically to
further our understanding of the functional and neural
mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self conscious-
ness. Importantly, these findings will also help physi-
cians in diagnosing and treating affected patients. The
neuroscientific study of the self is in its infancy and
there are currently no established models, very little
data, and often not even the vocabulary to describe neu-
roscientific notions of the self and its relation to the sub-
ject’s body. This complexity is especially evident when
patients describe doubles to their physicians. We
believe that the investigation of the phenomenological,
functional, and neural mechanisms leading to the
experience of a double in neurological patients (and
healthy subjects) is likely to improve our neuroscientific
models of embodiment, self, and subjectivity.
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